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TRANSITIONAL EQUALITY

*

Suzanne A. Kim

ABSTRACT
Legal discussions of inequality often focus on the virtues of one legal status or
regulatory structure over another, but a guaranteeof the right to a particular
legal status does not ensure a lived experience of equality in that status. In
moments of legal change, when a person or class of persons obtain a new status or gain rights that had previously been denied to them, the path from one
legal status to another becomes critically important and may itself be impacted by race, gender, age, and other factors. The process of transitioning to a
new status can be complex and burdensome in unexpected ways, and lack of
attention to that process can impairpersons' inhabitation of their newly acquired legal rights.
This article examines the underexplored issue of inequality in the process of
shifting legal relational status and posits a new framework of "Transitional
Equality" to address vulnerabilitiesthat may arise during the process of transition itself. Focusing on the constitutional law of intimacy, this article discusses the specific case study of tens of thousands of same-sex couples who
have transitionedfrom the legal status of unmarried to marriedafter the Supreme Court's 2015 decision on marriage equality in Obergefell v. Hodges.
Same-sex couples face substantially different process burdens than differentsex couples when moving from from unmarried to married, and for some cou-
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ples the burdens may be exacerbated by racism, poverty, and other structural
obstacles. Achieving the promise of equality requires attention to such factors
and their impact on the lived experience of becoming married.
TransitionalEquality is a framework for identifying obstacles to full enjoyment of new legal rights and building resilience in the process of moving from
one legal relational status to another. This article situates this new framework in reference to critical legal theory, constitutional doctrine, legal policy,
and areasfor future policy innovation and sociolegal research.
We are in the midst of a robust public discussion of various forms of inequality, including in regard to gender and sexuality, economic opportunity, health,
criminal justice, immigration, education, and other areas. Transitional
Equality provides a framework for identifying obstacles and solutions on the
path to achieving equal rights that have been promised under law.
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INTRODUCTION

Law and legal scholarship struggle frequently over the comparative virtues of one regulatory regime or category over another.' Scant attention is paid to the process of transitioning from
one legal status category to another, its social, psychological, and
legal dimensions, attendant challenges, and opportunities for fostering resilience. 2 During times of social movement and rollback
across a variety of domains, including within the financial, technological, and health care sectors, resilience through legal status
transition for individuals, families, and communities is an important but woefully under-examined area. 3
This article takes up this issue in the context of the constitutional law of family to advance the concept of transitional equality. 4 I argue that a robust account of equality and justice for families must attend to the sociolegal process of claiming rights
through legal status transitions. This transition may go less noticed in situations representing movements into favored legal status categories, given the social progress such access promises. I
highlight some ways in which the day-to-day experience of legal
status transitions demands a multidimensional concept of legal
process. I also argue for a multidisciplinary conception of resilience as a basis for achieving transitional equality.
In a recent essay, I embarked on a consideration of the Su5
preme Court's historical decision in Obergefell v. Hodges and the
ensuing nationwide marriage equality giving rise to what I
termed "relational migration," the process of transitioning from
one relationship status to another.6 Since the Obergefell decision,
over 157,000 same-sex couples have married in the United

1. See generally Suzanne A. Kim, Relational Migration, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 981 (2016).
2. Id. at 1007-08.
I thank the Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative for fostering im3.
portant dialogue on issues of legal transition.
4. There is much to explore in sociolegal aspects of inequality in status shifts, including in emerging or ever-evolving areas like cryptocurrency, artificial intelligence, cannabis, and health care.
-, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding in part that "the right to
5. 576 U.S. _,
marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty").
6. Kim, supra note 1, at 981-82.
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States.7 Many of these couples were in long-standing relationships, often for decades, prior to marrying.8 The availability of
marriage importantly offers greater legal protections to families
than those available in a pre-Obergefell world. 9 In this prior work,
I have focused on a different question than the fortunately decided issue of constitutional access to legal marriage. I have previously introduced my argument that a robust account of equality
and justice for families must capture the sociolegal process of
claiming rights through legal status transitions.1 0 This transition
may go less noticed in situations representing movements into favored legal status categories, given the social progress such access promises." I have begun to highlight some ways in which relational migration gives rise to important transitional status

7.

Id. (citing Adam P. Romero, 1.1 Million LGBT Adults Are Married to Someone of

the Same Sex at the Two- Year Anniversary of Obergefell v. Hodges, WILLIAMS INST. (June

23, 2017), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edulwp-content/uploads/Obergefel-2-YearMarriages.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YEP-MSSJ]).
8. Kim, supra note 1, at 981 (citing Ellen D.B. Riggle et al., Impact of Civil Marriage
Recognition for Long-Term Same-Sex Couples, 14 SExuALITY RES. & Soc. POLY 223, 223
(2017)) ("Survey findings suggest that many of the couples who marry immediately after a
state changes its law are on average older and have been in their relationship for many
years, compared to different-sex couples who marry. For example, the average age of
same-sex couple members who married shortly after marriage became legal in France,
Massachusetts, Illinois, and several provinces in Canada was approximately 10 years older than different-sex couple members marrying in the same period of time."); Esther D.
Rothblum et al., Comparison of Same-Sex Couples Who Were Married in Massachusetts,
Had Domestic Partnerships in California, or Had Civil Unions in Vermont, 29 J. FAM.
ISSUES 48, 62 tbl.2 (2008) (finding same-sex couples had been living together an average of
eleven years prior to their marriage during the first year that same-sex marriages were
available in Massachusetts). According to Gallup poll results issued nearly one year after
the Obergefell decision, "roughly half of all cohabiting same-sex couples are married, up
from 38% a year ago." Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriages Up One Year After Supreme
Court Verdict, GALLUP (June 22, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/pol/193055/sex-marriagesone-year-supreme-court-verdict.aspx?version=print [https://perma.cc/6FR8-FFT9]. As discussed previously, "[i]t is likely that at least some of these married couples were in cohabiting relationships prior to marriage." Kim, supra note 1, at 982 (citing William Wan, Gay
Marriages Way Up a Year After U.S. Supreme Court Legalization, WASH. POST (June 22,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/06/22/gay-marriagesway-up-a-year-after-u-s-supreme-court-legalization
[https://perma.cc/5D6N-JCA9]
("[Miany same-sex couples 'who were already living together got married in the past year,'
even though others 'stopped living together or considering themselves to be domestics
partners."')).
9. Kim, supra note 1, at 987-88.
10. Id. at 1001.
11. We see similar dynamics evident in other contexts in which legal change is understood categorically as a form of social progress. Id. at 990 (citing KENJI YOSHINO,
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 184-96 (2006)); see RACHEL F.
MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 61-75, 184-96

(2001); see also, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, DiscouragingRacial Preferences in Adoptions,
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1415, 1428-29 (2006).
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questions best viewed through a multidimensional lens of legal
process.
In this article, I situate relational transition and its process in
a broader context of transitional equality, engaging insights from
sociolegalism, social-psychology's procedural justice, and vulnerability theory as pathways toward building more robust equality
for families. I continue to challenge a vision "of legal frameworks
as existing statically alongside one another" to "bring H the transition process front and center."1 2 This focus conceptualizes transition more broadly than traditionally conceived, including alongside technical legal process, systemic, social, and psychological
3
aspects of relational migration.1 This expanded view of the transitional process has sought to "uncover fluid engagements between form and social practice within legal relational categories,
including marriage."1 4 I have argued that this "non-binaristic
conception of legal categories further exposes ways in which formal access to rights is not self-effectuating" and can "reveal the
complex and multi-dimensional aspects of status change."'
The present article further examines the interplay between select legal questions and extralegal impacts, giving rise to unique
challenges in the transition into the marital regime for same-sex
couples. While formally "equal," people transitioning into marriage-especially when considering age and gender-encounter
unique process burdens occasioned by these distinct legal challenges and broader contexts of legal and social uncertainty. Additionally, race and socioeconomic status are likely to play important roles in experiences of transition into marriage. Those
who marry, among different-sex couples, are more commonly socioeconomically privileged. Accordingly, these couples' experiences are less instructive for understanding how class and race may
affect relational transition for same-sex couples. The demographic
6
profile of same-sex married couples is a work in progress;1 as as12. Kim, supra note 1, at 983.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. It is likely that this picture will take a number of years to develop, due to widening data gaps, especially those concerning gender and sexual minorities in the United
States. In March of 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services eliminated questions about LGBT people from the following two surveys: The National Survey of Older
Americans Act Participantsand the Centers for Independent Living Annual ProgramPerformance Report. Praveen Hernandez, Opinion, The Census Won't Collect L.G.B.T. Data.
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pects of this view become clearer, however, legal and social science scholars will do well to attend to this picture to address the
process of relational transition for same-sex couples-and all families-including aging couples and those with children.1 7
This article pursues two broad goals. The first is "substantive"
in nature-to highlight the connection between relational status
transition and equality. In doing so, this article connects to varied
scholarship in equality law in domestic and international contexts.18 The second is methodological. I seek, through an intentional embrace of various disciplinary standpoints, to uncover the
richness of lived experiences of movements across legal status
categories, focused on the intimate sphere. In so doing, I set forth
transitional equality as crucial for social equality, which is necessarily a dynamic and multilayered enterprise. Focusing on transitional equality provides an important opportunity to consider the
role of advocates, legal education, and systemic reform in bolstering social equality and resilience.
In identifying transitional equality, this article seeks to bring
into dialogue and enrich insights from three literatures, sociolegalism, social psychological discourse on procedural justice, and
legal theory on vulnerability. Sociolegalism guides us toward a
view of law as nested within society and provides a rich opportunity to address distributive equality and gaps between law on

That's a Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com
/ 2 017/05/10/opinion/the-census-wont-collect-1gbt-data-thats-a-problem.html
[https://perma
.cc/9T7P-NUUF] (noting that without data on sexuality and gender identity, "we don't
know the size of the LGBT population or how that population is geographically distributed"); Mary Emily O'Hara, L.G.B.T. Americans Won't Be Counted in 2020 U.S. Census After
All, NBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2017, 1:27 PM EDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbcout/1gbtq-americans-won-t-be-counted-2020-u-s-census-n73991 1
[https://perma.cc/JMV7B3H4] (noting that the exclusion of LGBT Americans from census data "makes it challenging for federal agencies and researchers to accurately track the size, demographics and
needs of the community"). Notably, the 2020 United States Census will include a question
about whether a respondent is in a same-sex or an opposite-sex relationship, but this
question is not a sufficient substitute for independent questions regarding sexual orientation and gender identity. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, QUESTIONS PLANNED FOR THE
2020 CENSUS AND AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 65 (2018), https://assets.documentcloud

.org/documents/4426784/Planned-Questions-2020-Acs.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHG4-6PPH].
17. We might infer greater racial and ethnic diversity amongst same-sex married couples than among different-sex marriage couples, as same-sex couples are more likely to be
interracial or interethnic than different-sex couples. Gary J. Gates, Same-Sex Couples in
Census 2010: Race and Ethnicity, WILLIAMS INST., https://williamsinstitute.law
.ucla.edulwp-content/uploads/Gates-CouplesRaceEthnicity-April-2012.pdf
[https://perma
.ccl6RJ6-KDXP] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
18. See infra Part VI.B.
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the books and law as lived. Procedural justice helps to illuminate
the various social and legal burdens that can characterize-and
19
remain hidden-in claims toward greater substantive rights.
Vulnerability theory generates ideas for fostering greater social
20
resilience, by which I mean the capacity to respond to change.
Connecting these theoretical frameworks uncovers possibilities
for how to address vulnerabilities that emerge in status change
and engage social and state institutions in building resilience,
which I argue is a goal of transitional equality.
As I elaborate upon in this article, a focus on transitional
equality sheds light on the ways in which movement into legal
status categories, even those involving privileged treatment, is itself a dynamic enterprise. Although dominant understandings of
marriage access might suggest immediate family equality, the
boundaries and benefits of marriage are not self-actualizing, especially for couples whose relationships have existed in frameworks of incremental or patchwork recognition. Indeed, crossing
the legal border from nonmarital to marital relationships for
many same-sex couples involves negotiating the very boundaries
of the legal category that migrants seek to inhabit. In other
words, as couples move into the institutional house of marriage,
they must often determine where the walls of that house are located. A focus on transition reveals a range of process encounters,
including those pertaining to legal consciousness, access to jus21
tice, uncertainty, and impact on the self and family.

19. See Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in ProceduralDue Process, in DUE PROCESS 126, 127-28 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., Plenum
Press 1988) (1977); see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 170-72 (1988).
20. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8-10 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Vulnerable Subject] (engaging vulnerability theory to promote resilience through the law and
other social mechanisms, and arguing that vulnerability theory has the potential to "describ[e] a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition"); see also Kim,
supra note 1, at 984 & n.10 ("Vulnerability initially should be understood as arising from
our embodiment, which carries with it the ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and
misfortune from mildly adverse to catastrophically devastating events, whether accidental, intentional, or otherwise."). See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH (2004) [hereinafter FINEMAN, AUTONOMY] (laying the conceptual foundation later termed the theory of vulnerability).
21. I also intend to connect this inquiry more broadly to considerations of how we understand other kinds of legal migrations, particularly those involving movement toward
greater formal equality. These types of legal migration may be viewed as a form of "agentic legal migration," insofar as they bring with them improved formal legal status.
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In this ongoing conversation about families and legal status
transition, I aim to speak to diverse legal scholars, social scientists, judges, practitioners, policymakers, and those working at
the intersections of these groups, with a continuing goal of identifying areas of future inquiry, research, policy innovation, and
theoretical expansion within and across law, social science, and
policy.

22

This article proceeds in six parts. First, I assert the importance
of the sociolegal dimension of equality. Second, I explore the concept of relational status transition. Third, I set forth three theoretical frames for this discussion: sociolegalism, procedural justice, and vulnerability theory. Fourth, I discuss distinct doctrinal
issues arising through the passage from nonmarried to married
statuses, that center on the need to confirm the very boundaries
of marriage evoked by legal status transition. Fifth, I explore the
variety of process encounters connected to these doctrinal questions that inform the experience of relational status transition.
Sixth, I offer proposals aimed at bolstering social resilience, taking sociolegal process into account, in order to achieve transitional equality for families. I situate these ideas in reference to critical
legal
theory,
constitutional
doctrine,
policy
and
infrastructural innovation, and future directions for sociolegal research. I aim to illuminate in this part, and more generally, how
critical legal theory in the context of sociolegalism, procedural
justice, and vulnerability can inform and be informed by transitional equality.
I. EVERYDAY EQUALITY

We are in the midst of a vigorous, and long overdue, public
conversation about social inequality. Scholarship and public discourse on equality in a variety of disciplines, including law, economics, sociology, psychology, and public health focus on patterns
of economic, 23 racial 24 environmental, 2 5 and gender inequality. 26
22.

Kim, supra note 1, at 1008-09.

23.

See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Gold-

hammer trans., 2014).
24. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF
How OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).

25. See, e.g., Lindsey J. Butler et al., The Flint, Michigan, Water Crisis:A Case Study
in Regulatory Failureand Environmental Justice, 9 ENVTL. JUST. 93 (2016).
26.

See, e.g., UN WOMEN, TURNING PROMISES INTO ACTION: GENDER EQUALITY IN THE
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Inequality presents itself through far-reaching disparities in con29
texts of income, 27 social mobility, 2 8 criminal justice, educational
3 0 organizational leadership, 3 1 and health. 32 Inequalities, of
access,
course, manifest on a global level-between and within nations as
well.

33

Legal and social scientific scholarship on inequality, while not
necessarily explicitly styled as such, frequently orient toward
equality or inequality in outcomes. The study of inequality is
comparative, in relation to such social outcomes or endpoints.
Law, for instance, takes up as central the attainment of formal
access to rights. 34 This framing is understandable, as in many
35
ways, this serves as a foundation for claiming rights. This arti-

2030

AGENDA

FOR

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT

(2018),

http://www.unwomen.org

/en/digital-library/publications/2018/2/gender-equality-in-the-2030-agenda-for-sustainabledevelopment-2018 [https://perma.cc/69P7-BRLJ].
27. See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 23, at 23-24; FAQs About the Wage Gap, NAT'L
WOMEN'S L. CTR., https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/FAQ-About-the-Wage-Gap2016-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYU5-PE2A] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
28. See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 23, at 239-40.
29.

See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010).

30. See e.g., Richard Rothstein & Mark Santow, A Different Kind of Choice: Educational Inequality and the Continuing Significance of Racial Segregation (Aug. 21, 2012)
(working paper, Economic Policy Institute), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED537326.pdf
[https://perma.cc/55KB-BUDT].
31.

See, e.g., AAUW, BARRIERS AND BIAS: THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP

(2016), https://www.aauw.org/researchlbarriers-and-bias/ [https://perma.cc/6ZAR-HTCZ].
See, e.g., DONALD A. BARR, HEALTH DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: SOCIAL
32.
CLASS, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND HEALTH (2d ed. 2014); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2015: WITH SPECIAL FEATURE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC

HEALTH DISPARITIES 20 (2016); Myra J. Tucker et al., The Black- White Disparity in Pregnancy-Related Mortality from 5 Conditions: Differences in Prevalence and Case-Fatality
Rates, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 247 (2007); Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, Black Mothers
Keep Dying After Giving Birth. Shalon Irving's Story Explains Why, NPR (Dec. 7, 2017,
7:51 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/07/568948782/black-mothers-keep-dying-aftergiving -birth-shalon-irvings-story-explains-why [https://perma.cc/2YVQ-9HJ2].
33. See, e.g., BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND
GLOBAL INEQUALITY 44 (2005).

34. Within law, a focus on equality examines modes in which constitutional equality
doctrine is conceptualized and carried out. This includes examination of equal protection
doctrine's origins, construction, modes, promise, and failures.
35. I do not take up here the long-standing and important doctrinal debates within
antidiscrimination scholarship about the value of equality frameworks as compared to
others for achieving justice. Catharine MacKinnon, Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and
others have asserted antisubordination as a more promising alternative to traditional liberalism's

framing

based

on

equality.

See

CATHARINE

A.

MACKINNON,

FEMINISM

UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45 (1987); Charles R. Lawrence III, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317, 320-21 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw,
and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1330-33 (1991). This
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cle seeks to carve out a distinct space for sociolegal consideration
of equality and to lay a foundation for examining transition in relation to that sociolegal consideration.
What does a sociolegal sphere entail? I use the term "sociolegal" to be loosely interchangeable, or at least encompassing of the
"law and society movement." 36 As described by Lawrence Friedman,
The law and society movement is the scholarly enterprise that ex-

plains or describes legal phenomena in social terms. To put it another way, it is the scholarly enterprise that examines the relationship
between two types of social phenomena: those conventionally classi-

fied as 'legal' and those that are classified as nonlegal. 37

And while the enterprise contains diversity in method and approach, scholars in law and society share "a general commitment
to approach law with a vision and with methods that come from
outside the discipline itself; and they share a commitment to explain legal phenomena (though not necessarily all legal phenomena) in terms of their social setting."38

critique focuses on the limitations of an equality framework-requiring, like equal protection doctrine does, that those seeking equal treatment establish similarity or sameness to
dominant standards. See MACKINNON, supra, at 32-45. For instance, as MacKinnon argues, the requirement for sameness sets women and minorities up to meet standards constructed not to be met. Id. As I have written elsewhere:
Furthermore, at worst, women and racial minorities face a doctrinal trap in
which they are never meant to gain equality, since women and racial minorities are socially defined as "different." Equality claims ultimately collapse
inward, as they are founded on a disingenuous structure that treats sameness and difference as exact opposites, when, in actuality, they bear a hierarchical relationship to one another, with "difference" masking the subordination of women and racial minorities. Therefore, the "difference" that these
rights seekers must overcome is actually the subordinated positions they hold
in gender and racial hierarchies, respectively.
Suzanne A. Kim, Comment, "Yellow" Skin, "White" Masks: Asian American "Impersonations" of Whiteness and the Feminist Critique of Liberal Equality, 8 ASIAN L.J. 89, 90
(2001) (writing about MacKinnon's critique of liberal equality in the context of historical
citizenship claims by Asians in the United States).
36. This comports with common usage within sociolegal literature. See, e.g., Susan S.
Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 323, 323 n.1 (2005). According to Silbey, "Although the latter term was originally used more in Europe, it has become
conventional in the United States as well." Id; see also Sandra R. Levitsky et al., "Legality
with a Vengeance'. Reclaiming Distributionfor Sociolegal Studies, 52 LAw & SOc'y REV.
709, 709 (2018).
37. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763,
763-64 (1986).
38. Id. In a nod to the capaciousness, even unwieldiness, of the law and society umbrella, Friedman has written:
"Law and society movement" is a rather awkward term. But there is no other
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Sociolegal scholarship's emphasis on the social lends itself well
to considering the everyday aspect of law. This body of work's
conceptual starting point of "law in action" sheds light on the recursive relationship between law and legality on the one hand
and lived experience on the other. Patricia Ewick's and Susan
Silbey's foundational The Common Place of Law illuminates the
complicated and varied ways in which people engage, resist, and
defer to the law. 39 Sociolegal studies are predicated on an assumption that the legal and the social inform one another to varying degrees, that, indeed, these domains take turns shaping one
another. 40
41
Law and society de-exceptionalizes law as a discipline. This
framework conceptualizes law as a mode nested within society, as

obvious collective label to describe the efforts of sociologists of law, anthropologists of law, political scientists who study judicial behavior, historians who
explore the role of nineteenth century lawyers, psychologists who ask why juries behave as they do, and so on.
Id. An account of the intellectual history of the law and society movement lies beyond the
scope of this article. Generally speaking, the law and society movement is commonly observed as having begun in the 1960s, with the Law and Society Association founded in
1964 and the Law and Society Review founded in 1966. Lawrence M. Friedman, Coming of
Age: Law and Society Enters an Exclusive Club, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCl. 1, 15 (2005).
Lawrence Friedman has located the theoretical origins of the "social study of law," on
which law and society is based, within the nineteenth century,
with figures like Sir Henry Maine, who published Ancient Law in 1861, and
Max Weber, who was one of the founding parents. The movement depends on
two rather modern ideas. The first is that legal systems are essentially manmade objects-social creations, in other words. The second, which is closely
related, is the idea of cultural relativity. Law varies in time and space, according to the conditions of the culture in which it is embedded.
Friedman, supra note 37, at 764. Relevant to contemporary studies of inequality focused
on antisubordination,
[s]ociolegal studies employ a variety of qualitative and quantitative techniques for cataloging and exploring the law in everyday life, but the use of
first person narratives is often an integral part of these projects. The centrality of these narratives in sociolegal studies methodology provides CRT/CRF
scholars with an opportunity to learn from the work of other disciplines and a
potential basis to reply to critiques that have been skeptical of the ways outsider scholars use narrative. I suggest that beyond exploring methodological
synergies, CRT/CRF scholars should look more generally to interdisciplinary
approaches and scholarship to support their methods and advance antisubordination theories.
Mario L. Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power of
Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941, 948-49 (2006).
39. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE, at xi (1998).
40. See id. at 15-17.
41. See id. at 18-19.
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others are. 4 2 This insight from sociolegal scholarship, reaching
back far beyond American legal realism, 43 paves the way for understanding law itself as subject to social forces, as any other
mode of organizing society and regulating people. 44 According to
Susan Silbey, sociolegal scholarship's focus "has been decentering, concerned not with what the law is but with what the law
does," 4 5 and pursues the broad claim that "[1]egal institutions
cannot be understood without seeing the entire social environment." 4 6 This foundation enables us to view legal intervention as
one pathway, alongside others, for shaping and being shaped by
the world. It opens analytical space for understanding the relationships between legal and nonlegal social dynamics. These insights are particularly important for addressing enduring social
challenges and problems, such as inequality in its many guises.
In many ways, the study of inequality is baked into sociolegal
research. The dichotomy around which sociolegal scholarship revolves-the gap between law "on the books" and law "in action"4 7-proceeds from a core concern about inequality. We may
also think of this as the gap between formal law and law as lived
or between formal and substantive equality. 48 Building on these
42. See id. at 16.
43. See Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 165, 170 (1987) ("Law and society research has roots far
deeper and older than the American realists, origins that lie within the modern conception
of law itself.").
44. Id. at 165, 173. The intellectual history of law and society and sociolegal scholarship, as it relates to legal realism, lies beyond the scope of this article.
45. Silbey & Sarat, supra note 43, at 165.
46. Id. Brian Tamanaha's discussion of the sociolegal vision presented by Marc Galanter's far-ranging work applies broadly to sociolegalism. Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Holistic
Vision of the Socio-Legal Terrain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 89-91 (2008) ("Above all
else, Galanter has a thoroughly social view of law: law is a social product-a complex of
activities of real people with socially shared and produced, but individually carried out,
legal and nonlegal ideas, beliefs, motivations, and purposes. Law is inseparable from and
embedded in-an integrated aspect of-social life. Galanter applies this sociological lens to
legal actors as well as to nonlegal actors. He looks at how and what people inside and outside the official legal system think about law, and he examines their activities in connection with law." (discussing Marc Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in MODERNIZATION
153 (Myron Weiner ed., 1966); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1-2 (1981); Marc Galanter, Law
Abounding: LegalisationAround the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1992)).
47. Silbey & Sarat, supra note 43, at 170-71.
48. YOSHINO, supra note 11, at 184-96 (2006) (addressing the social and legal imperative to "cover" to assimilate to dominant norms, notwithstanding advances in civil rights
law); see, e.g., MORAN, supra note 11, at 61-75, 184-96 (2001) (examining the persistence
of racial segregation in intimacy); see also, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 11, at 1427-29
(2006) (discussing cognitive bias of whites, despite antidiscrimination law advances). We

1162

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1149

critically important investigations, a sociolegal consideration of
equality could reach even farther.

A. Minding the Gap
First, we might explore this gap itself for its social significance.
For instance, as Silbey and Ewick ask, what is the relationship
between law's perceived legitimacy and its known inequality?
Why do people still embrace the law, even knowing that the
49
Silbey and
"haves" usually come out ahead of the "have-nots?"
Ewick examine the ideological significance of the contradictions
within law and legality as a mechanism of its durable hegemony.50 "Thus, it is precisely because law is both god and gimmick,
sacred and profane, objective, disinterested, and a terrain of legitimate partiality that it persists and endures," Ewick and Silbey
observe.5 1 "It is precisely because people believe that there is
equality under law but also understand that sometimes the
'haves' come out ahead that legality is sustained as a powerful
structure of social action." 52 This question has particular reso-

may also bring this scholarship more tightly into consideration alongside constitutional
inquiry.

&

49. Ewick and Silbey pose this question, in relation to Marc Galanter's work, which
demonstrated that repeat players benefitted more in the legal system. Patricia Ewick
Susan S. Silbey, Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique: The Significance of Knowing That the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, 33 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 1025, 1036 (1999) ('This
finding--commonly expressed alternative and opposing stories of law-brings us back to
the question we posed at the beginning of this paper: What is the ideological significance
of knowing that the 'haves' come out ahead? Is legality rendered imperfect, flawed, and
vulnerable because it is understood to be a game as well as transcendent, a realm of power
as well as a realm of disinterested decisionmaking? Does an awareness of the structural
contradictions of law-knowing, despite formal assurances of equality before the law, that
the 'haves' really do come out ahead-lead to critique and disillusionment?" (citing Marc
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974))).
50. In answering these questions, we suggest precisely the opposite, arguing
that the multiple and contradictory meanings of legality protect it from-rather
than expose it to-radical critique. For too many years, sociolegal scholars have
interpreted the gap between the law on the books and the law in action as a
problem, an imperfection in the fabric of legality, something to be repaired. Rather than a flaw, or something to be explained away, we need to think about
how the apparent oppositions and contradictions-the so-called gap-might actually operate ideologically to define and sustain legality as a durable and powerful social institution.
Ewick & Silbey, supra note 49, at 1036.
51. Id. at 1040.
52. Id.
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nance today, as powerful critiques enswathe our current sociolegal institutions, alongside appeals to their authority.53
Ewick and Silbey suggest moving past the conventional framing of law and society scholarship around this gap between law on
the books and law in action. They observe, "In an important
sense, then, we have moved beyond conventional distinctions between ideals and practices, law on the books and law in action.
These distinctions enforce false dichotomies. Legality is composed
of multiple images and stories, each emplotting a particular relationship between ideals and practices, revealing their mutual interdependence." 54
I suggest that, rather than abandoning this framing, we continue to push the sociolegal enterprise to pursue this gap for additional dynamics contained within. Even assuming Ewick and
Silbey are right, that the contradictions in law contribute to its
social durability, how does this happen?5 5 A deeper inquiry into
sociolegal aspects of everyday equality, focusing on transition, can
shed some light. 56
B. Distribution
A sociolegal account of everyday equality might also address
the distributive function of law more squarely. Sandra R. Levitsky, Rachel Kahn Best, and Jessica Garrick have observed sociolegal scholarship's consistent push to broaden understandings of
what counts as "law."57 Within this context, they critique the pre-

dominant focus within sociolegal scholarship on the state's regulation of behavior, at the exclusion of examining "laws in which

53. See e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: How
PARTISAN DISIONs CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 8-11 (2019).

54. Ewick & Silbey, supra note 49, at 1040 ("Because legality has this internal complexity-among and within the schema-it effectively universalizes legality. Any particular experience or account can fit within the diversity of the whole. Rather than simply an
idealized set of ambitions and hopes, a fragile bulwark in the face of human variation,
agency, and interest, legality is observed as both the ideal (and indeed several different
ideals) as well as a space of powerful action. The persistently perceived gap is a space, not
a vacuum; it is, in short, one source of the law's hegemonic power.").

55. I would also suggest further exploration about what we should do with this observation, what its normative implications are-from a day to day perspective. But I leave
that conversation for another day.
56. See infra Part VI.A.
57. Levitsky et al., supranote 36, at 710.
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58
the state distributes resources, goods, and services." This focus
on regulation as compared to distribution, they argue, diminishes
the opportunity to illuminate law's implications for economic inequality. 59

A focus on transition can itself be a distributive one. The latter
inquiry leans heavily on the equality-based foundation of sociolegal scholarship. It accounts for the ways in which law and legal
institutions as systems reflect and reinforce inequality. The role
of law and legal institutions in the production of inequality
should include consideration not just of how people experience the
legal system and rights contained therein, as a flat construct, but
the many dimensions of how individuals, families, and communities navigate legal systems, migrating across legal status categories as they claim rights. As I discuss in the next part, marital
transition provides an explicit frame for the multiple dimensions
of moving through the legal system toward claiming rights. This
passage for families in the context of marital transition, for instance, is shaped by distributive inequality in a variety of forms,
as I discuss in this article.
Marriage's sociolegal constitution and influence-consisting of
robust formal law and a rich tapestry of social norms-provides a
particularly useful opportunity to consider regulatory and distributive functions of the law and their interplay. Both within
marriage and surrounding it, we see the ways in which marriage,
by law and norm, regulates and distributes within its boundaries
and across families. The transition into this status permits a closer perspective on these regulatory and distributive dynamics,
shedding light on marriage status itself and on the experience of
transition across legal status categories.6 0

58. Id. at 709-10 ("The law and society community has argued for decades for an expansive understanding of what counts as 'law.' But a content analysis of articles published
in the Law & Society Review from its 1966 founding to the present finds that since the
1970s, the law and society community has focused its attention on laws in which the state
regulates behavior, and largely ignored laws in which the state distributes resources,
goods, and services.").
59. Id. at 710 ("We find that sociolegal scholarship has always used 'law on the books'
as a starting point for analyses (often to identify departures in 'law in action') without ever
offering a programmatic vision for how law might ameliorate economic inequality. As a
result, when social welfare laws on the books began disappearing, sociolegal scholarship
drifted away from studying law's role in creating, sustaining, and reinforcing economic
inequality.").
60. See infra Part III.

2019]

TRANSITIONAL EQUALITY

1165

II. IDENTIFYING TRANSITION

Movements across relationship status categories are not new.6 1
Indeed, different-sex couples have moved across the marital
boundary routinely. And "[w]hile extensive literatures have developed regarding the social experiences of intimacy outside of
and inside of marriage," 62 there has been very little study of the
transition across the marital boundary by any couples-same-sex
or different-sex. 6 3 With nationwide marriage equality a relatively
recent phenomenon, researchers have had 'little contemporary
opportunity to consider this kind of status migration for same-sex
couples." 6 4 Moreover, researchers have lacked opportunities to

examine the impacts of marriage on families over time, in the
context of same-sex marriage. 65
Studying the impacts of marriage, and transitional legal experiences, is deeply important for understanding how law works on
the ground. This helps to enrich our understanding of how equality and inequality work, apart from formal aspiration. Constitutional legal analysis, painted in broad analytical strokes, is illsuited to capturing ongoing gaps between social and formal equality. "While legal scholars have commented on gaps between formal and substantive equality and flaws in realizing the promise

61.

Kim, supra note 1, at 983.

62. Id. (citing PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES (1983);
ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (2003); Sondra E.

Solomon et al., Money, Housework, Sex, and Conflict: Same-Sex Couples in Civil Unions,
Those Not in Civil Unions, and Heterosexual Married Siblings, 52 SEX ROLES 561 (2005)).
63. Id. at 982-83.
64.

Id. at 983 (citing KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERLS OF MARRIAGE

EQUALITY 23-116 (2015)) (comparing the same-sex marriage movement with marriage
experiences of newly emancipated African Americans in the nineteenth century); see also
Esther D. Rothblum et al., Narrativesof Same-Sex Couples Who Had Civil Unions in Vermont: The Impact of Legalizing Relationships on Couples and on Social Policy, 8
SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL'Y 183, 183-84 (2011) (studying same-sex couples in Vermont
who obtained civil unions during the first year Vermont had enacted civil union legislation
to legalize same-sex relationships).
65. Kim, supra note 1, at 991-92. ("Since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health held, in 2003, that same-sex couples are constitutionally entitled to marriage access, a body of literature has emerged concerning the
impacts of marriage on U.S. couples. This research has generally been conducted on an
individual-state basis, based on the piecemeal progression of marriage rights in this country. Only now is qualitative research being conducted in the context of nationwide marriage equality, however, and none of the research is yet longitudinal, which would help
capture the impact of marriage over the course of relationships. Research in this developing area, however, highlights important experiences of same-sex couples in transitions into marriage and in this transitional moment in history." (footnotes omitted)).
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of important legal change, a focus on relational migration, embodied in an expanded view of process, permits a closer view of the
various challenges and potential resiliencies that can occur during status transition." 66 This focus is especially important when
equality may be assumed due to substantial formal legal progress. 67
The focus on transition across the marital border is important
and intentional. "One of the most stark delineations in the law of
68
intimacy is the divide between marital and nonmarital units."

As previously described, "[t]his divide-and the accompanying
privileging of marriage-has been the subject of important and
sustained critique by scholars, based on the marginalizing effect
that this legal framework has on nonmarital families and on individuals." 6 9 A focus on relational transition can help reveal the

66.

Id. at 984.
To situate this analysis further, I note that discussions abound in antidiscrimination law and legal scholarship on gaps between social and formal
equality in a variety of domains. This understanding is critical to drawing attention to the gaps that exist between law on the books and law on the
ground. Alongside this perspective, however, we must examine the movement
across legal status borders. Even with legal reform aimed at better unifying
formal and substantive equality in various domains, transitions between legal categories will always exist, introducing unique experiences for those involved.

Id. at 990-91 (footnote omitted). Study resilience involves examining and addressing differences in social assets that people have to respond to vulnerability that is universal to
the human condition. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 20, at 8-10 (explaining that
vulnerability theory has the potential to "describ[e] a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition").
67. Kim, supra note 1, at 984.
68. Id. at 985.
69. Id. (citing FRANKE, supra note 64, at 11; NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT
AND GAY) MARRIAGE (2008) [hereinafter POLIKOFF, BEYOND MARRIAGE]; Paula L. Ettel-

brick, Since When Is Marriagea Path to Liberation?, OUT[LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9, 14-17;
Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 A1. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 167, 173-75 (2000) [hereinafter Polikoff, Why Read Fineman];
Laura A. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 769, 77079 (2013)); Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and NonmarriageInequality, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 1207 (2016). I have previously deployed the metaphor of migration to set the stage
for understanding the range of dynamic change that can arise from relational status transition, much in ways that physical movement ushers in a range of legal and social impacts.
Kim, supra note 1, at 983 ("The migration metaphor resonates with the various movements we see in our contemporary world, with people and institutions routinely moving
from one place to another. The literature of immigration and migration marks the distinctness of immigration and migration experiences." (citing CARLOS BULOSAN, AMERICA IS
IN THE HEART (1943); GROWING UP ETHNIC IN AMERICA (Maria Mazziotti Gillan & Jennifer
Gillan eds., 1999); JESSICA HAGEDORN, THE GANGSTER OF LOVE (1996); JHUMPA LAHIRI,
INTERPRETER OF MALADIES (1999); CHANG-RAE LEE, A GESTURE LIFE (1999))). This meta-

phor of physical movement helps to connote the social and legal contours of formal legal
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"social and structural forces that impel movements into and experiences of marriage, especially those who marry later in a relationship."7 0
III. TRANSITION IN THEORY
A. Sociolegalism
As discussed previously, sociolegalism provides a useful
framework to explore equality and inequality. But how can sociolegalism also enable us to theorize about transition? By focusing
on the connection between law and other social forces, it serves as
rich terrain on which to explore the concept of law as interpreted,
lived, and shaped by daily life. Rather unsatisfyingly, as Austin
Sarat aptly notes, the sociolegal conversation on law and change,
however, frequently focuses rather statically on the gap between
law and social change or law's ability to produce social change.7 1
Little has been written in law and society about the process of legal status change as a topic in itself. Austin Sarat's brief essay in
his edited volume Transitions: Legal Change, Legal Meanings
raises some interesting introductory questions. Conventionally,
as he describes, law is often conceived of as an "island of stability." 7 2 Its "regular procedures . . . , its remove, its distant impartiality, provide reassurance that change can be managed, that order can be preserved, that transition will not disintegrate into

status categories. I do not address the diverse and far-reaching sociolegal impacts of physical migration of families, which falls beyond the scope of this article.
70. Kim, supra note 1, at 983. As I have previously set forth:
I do not enter the debate on whether the state should favor marriage as a
form of intimate organization. Regardless of whether marriage should exist
as a state-mediated institution, and whether this institution should occupy a
privileged status in the legal landscape, it is not a stretch to acknowledge
that, as a descriptive matter, marriage does exist as a state-mediated institution and that marriage does occupy a privileged status in the legal landscape
(for better or for worse). Even under marriage-neutral or marriage-skeptical
outlooks, couples who do decide to get married should not be impeded in their
ability to secure this right based on under-examined aspects of the relational
migration experience.
Id. at 992-93 (footnotes omitted).
71. Austin Sarat, What Transitions Mean to and for Law: An Introduction, in
TRANSITIONS: LEGAL CHANGE, LEGAL MEANINGS 1, 1 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012).

72.

Id.
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chaos." 7 3 As Gretchen Craft observes, the effort to contain this
74
"chaos," occupies "much human effort in ... law."

But what if we lean into that state of so-called chaos? What if
we look closely at the feared process of transition itself and explore that space as a subject unto itself? One possibility might be
to shine light onto "law itself . ..

as an instrument of change, fos-

tering transitions from one form of behavior to another, inside
and outside of formal institutions." 75 It can also show the ways in
which change disrupts law, exposing its limits and challenging its
conventions.76
"[T]he most storied of all transitions in political and legal theory" 7 7-that of "the state of nature to organized society," of Hobbes,
Locke, and Rousseau fame 7 -both underscores the fundamental
aspect of the study of transition but also its conventional limits.
Without attempting to take up even a fraction of this topic, this
article, by focusing on transition, bears some implications for the
notion of organized society and of a seemingly immutable law's
role within it.
Instead of merely focusing on the ways social change and law
are consonant, or whether "law is a valuable instrument of social
change," 79 Sarat points to a gap in scholarly literatureconcerning "what moments of legal change mean for law itself or
how legal institutions bring about and respond to times of transition in legal arrangements."8 0 Some types of transitions include
the movement from one administration to another within ongoing
political and legal order,8 1 transitions from illiberal to liberal regimes and legal transitions, 82 transitions from national to supranational political orders, 83 and the role of law in responding to

73. Id.; see also Stanley Fish, Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF
LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991).
74. Gretchen A. Craft, Note, The Persistence of Dread in Law and Literature, 102
YALE L.J. 521, 521-22 (1992).
75. Sarat, supra note 71, at 1.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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dramatic abuses of power and crimes committed under prior regimes. 84
Interestingly, the Sarat-edited volume was published at a time
widely perceived as one of profound social advancement-in the
midst of President Barack Obama's presidency. Some of the questions the book takes up, like the legitimacy of midnight regulations issued just prior to one presidential administration leaving
and another coming into office, 85 bear particular significance in
light of the progress narrative that characterized that time in recent history. 86 Sarat suggests a range of questions posed by the
relationship between law and transition. They include: "[W]hat
challenges do different transitions pose for law? When and why
do moments of transition encourage and nurture legal ingenuity
and resourcefulness? When and why do [transitions] precipitate
crises and breakdown in legal authority?"8 7 What is law's capacity
to provide stability in turbulent times?88

These are important questions, but they perpetuate a dichotomy of law and change as opposed to one another. Rather than
treating change, or transition, as exogenous to law and legality, I
suggest pushing on the idea of transition even more fully to explore the meaning of transition and to theorize that space. I assert the need to consider how transition can and should change
legal institutions. A focus on transition in the context of family
status movements can also highlight the impacts of change on in-

84. Id. In TransitionalJustice, Ruti Teitel takes up "diverse forms of reparatory justice," compared to formal legal institutions, in the context of transitional justice. RUTI G.
TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 119 (2000). I do not explore the area of transitional justice,
or Ruti Teitel's work further here, but both by topic (transition) and also by disciplinary
design (invoking formal legal and additional disciplinary means), transitional justice bears
significant implications for the idea of the process of relational migration.
85. See, e.g., Jack Beermann, Midnight Deregulation, in TRANSITIONS, supra note 71,
at 17-18.
86. The legal, political, and policy rollbacks that have occurred during the Trump administration across a wide range of legal and policy areas, including health care, environmental reform, LGBTQ rights, reproductive justice, and immigration challenge conventional narratives of progress, such as Francis Fukuyama's later disavowed The End of
History. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (Free Press
2006) (1992); see also Matthew Philips, Fukuyama: The End of the End of History,
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 19, 2008, 8:00 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/fukuyama-end-endhistory-88537 [https://perma.cc/RB7Z-PTV2].
87. Sarat, supra note 71, at 6-7.
88. This inquiry explores law's ability to manage transition and legal institutions as
adaptive, providing ways to channel conflict and express normative dissent in moments of
social and political change. See id. at 13.

1170

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1149

dividuals, families, and communities, and how those changes
shape sociolegal institutions.
B. ProceduralJustice
Located within sociolegal scholarship, the literature of procedural justice provides another generative source for theorizing relational status transition. The work of scholars like Tom Tyler,
Tracy Meares, and Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, rooted in social
psychology, explores the role of "process" in experiences of legal
outcomes.8 9 The research in procedural justice focuses on how
subjective perceptions of fairness of dispute resolution systems
shape individuals' trust in, cooperation with, 90 and overall view of
the legitimacy of substantive outcomes. 91
Procedural justice scholarship has often been thought to apply
to adversary contexts in the civil and criminal justice systems
and other types of dispute resolution. 92 While procedural justice
work tended, originally, to focus principally on litigants' experiences with the justice system, recent innovations in research have
explored other participants' experiences in the legal systemjudges, lawyers, staff, and other actors. 93 It has also considered
perceptions of fairness in other dispute resolution settings, as in
negotiation. Procedural justice has extended to a variety of other
community and relational contexts, such as policing, family dispute resolution, work supervision, and health care administration. 9 4 Perceptions of procedural fairness are shaped by a variety
of factors, including the structure of dispute resolution and the
nature of social interaction. For instance, the identity of decision
makers, litigants' or community members' treatment by systemic

89. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of ProceduralJustice in the
Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 152 (2011); Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair?
How Cops and Laypeople Perceive Good Policing, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 297, 300
(2015).
90. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 89, at 152-53.
91. Id. at 136-37. Alongside social scientists, legal scholars address "process fairness,"
focusing on this question through normative or doctrinal lenses. Hollander-Blumoff describes differences between social psychology's focus on procedural justice and legal analysis of process fairness. Id. at 142-46. I focus here on social scientific concepts of procedural
justice.
92. Id. at 142-46.
93. Id. at 146-48.
94. Id. at 133-34.
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actors, notice, and opportunities for participation are often
viewed as key. 95
Through its underlying commitments and its methodological
tone, procedural justice literature draws out the sociolegal dimensions of legal process inherent in a study of status transition.
First, procedural justice highlights the significance of process,
separate and apart from "substantive" legal rules, as a mode of
social justice. Procedural justice also broadens the conception of
what counts as process itself. Methodologically, social scientific
explorations within procedural justice deepen consideration of
process by moving beyond questions of procedural due process
doctrine or assessments of normative fairness of particular procedural rules. 96 It takes into account the host of factors that inform
experiences of law, and its procedure, including its people, its
places, its language, its demeanor, and its interactions with other
social contexts. Procedural justice, as does sociolegal work in general, assertively situates law and its institutions in broader contexts of social institutions and actors.
This expanded conception of process meshes with a consideration of relational status transition. Relational status movements
involve a variety of important dimensions, socially, psychologically, and legally.97 This analysis draws from procedural justice's
framing of process as dynamic, multidimensional, contextual, and
constructed. Procedural justice emphasizes the importance of subjective and day-to-day experiences with the law, informed by interlocking social influences.
C. Vulnerability Theory
Vulnerability theory, and its focus on supporting resilience, 98
provides useful insights for examining relational transition and

95. See Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL.
117, 121 (2000).
96. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 89, at 132-33.
97. Kim, supra note 1, at 1003-08; see Michelman, supra note 19, at 127-28; see also
LIND & TYLER, supra note 19, at 170-72.
98. See Kim, supra note 1, at 989 (citing Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 20,
at 13) ("The state facilitated institutions that have grown up around vulnerability are interlocking and overlapping, creating the possibility of layered opportunities and support
for individuals, but also containing gaps and potential pitfalls. These institutions collectively form systems that play an important role in lessening, ameliorating, and compensating for vulnerability.").
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its process. 99 As articulated by Martha Fineman, the theory proceeds from an assumption that vulnerability-or susceptibility to
change, as rooted in but not limited to, our physical embodiment-universally characterizes the human experience, including
100
In rebutting the libfor historically marginalized communities.
eral ideal of the autonomous subject in law and society, vulnerability theory creates an imperative for the state and institutions
10 1
to bolster resilience, or social capacity to confront change.
This analysis of the process of relational migration finds purchase in vulnerability theory's fundamental assumption that susceptibility to change characterizes the human condition. While
vulnerability theory proceeds initially from biological (or environmental) vulnerability endured by all over the life course, it is
not limited-even on its own terms-to this context. The social
movement that typifies relational transition also exposes vulnerability and provides opportunities for fostering resilience. Vulnerability theory offers key opportunities for thinking through
the process of relational transition. First, its conception is robustly multidisciplinary, which befits it for examining the various di102
Second, its rebuttal of an aumensions of relational migration.
clears the pathway for
subject
liberal
agentic,
fully
and
tonomous,

&

99. Id. at 988-90. As I have argued, a wider view of process encourages deeper thinking about fostering resilience in migrating individuals and their relationships, through
strengthening various forms of social connection and organization. This greater resilience,
in turn, can safeguard substantive rights more fully. This focus on relational migration is
not intended to suggest that the existence of gaps between formal and social equality
should influence our view of the importance of the pursuit of formal equality in the marriage context or in any others. Id. at 984 n.11.
100. See FINEMAN, AUTONOMY, supra note 20, at 288.
101. See also Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 20, at 9-10. I have argued:
In theorizing the under-studied process of relational migration, this analysis
also engages vulnerability theory, and more specifically, its focus on supporting resilience. Vulnerability theory paves the way for more supportive ways
to address the vulnerabilities that touch everyone's lives. This theory's attention to the condition of universal vulnerability, including for historically marginalized communities, and its attendant focus on encouraging greater social
strength or capacity in the face of that vulnerability, provides a particularly
generative framework for identifying opportunities for increasing resilience
in relational migration.
Kim, supra note 1, at 989 (citing Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 20, at 8-10, 2021) (discussing universal vulnerability as related to marginalized communities); see also
Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP. POL.
C.R. L. REV. 307, 309-10 (2014).
102. Kim, supra note 1, at 989 ("[This intentionally multidisciplinary problem-solving
approach is particularly well-suited to examining the many layers of relational migration."); see Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 20, at 9-10.
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identifying systemic challenges faced by individuals, families, and
communities, even those moving into domains of favored legal
status. It also enables us to consider the conditions that impel
parties to seek legal status change, even that sought "voluntarily," and the stakes from a resilience standpoint from these passages.
IV. TRANSITION IN ACTION

Access to marriage and the equal citizenship it represents is
not self-actualizing. As with many other legal transitions, couples
must pursue a process to obtain a legally favored relationship
status. But same-sex couples transitioning into the marital regime encounter unique legal challenges in the effort to reap fully
the benefits sought through marriage equality. This challenge revolves around the need to confirm the boundaries of the very legal
category into which couples seek to transition so that existing
claims and obligations correspond with a new legal status position. The need to address boundary confusion undoubtedly affects
a range of legal transition processes (like for longer-term or older
different-sex couples moving into marriage). Long-standing samesex couples may face this more acutely, however, given the broader context of legal indeterminacy that has surrounded same-sex
intimate relationships-as well as nonmarital relationships in
general. This broader context has included incremental or patchwork recognition, varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. I briefly highlight some key areas of boundary confirmation work distinct to marital transition by same-sex couples.
A. MaritalBeginnings
As in the law of intimacy in general, the nature of marriage is
often most saliently defined at or upon anticipation of its end-by
divorce or death. This is no less true for same-sex couples embarking on the legal transition into marriage. Same-sex couples
in long-standing relationships, however, are more likely to encounter marital boundary confusion, due to difficulties in determining when the marriage "began." Because many couples, especially female ones, 10 3 may have pursued various forms of legal or
103. Female couples are more likely to seek legal recognition of relationship status
than male couples. Brad van Eeden-Moorefield et al., Same-Sex Relationshipsand Disso-
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social recognition in a landscape of patchwork or incremental
recognition, preparation for marital dissolution may pose distinct
challenges when determining the relevant marital time period for
purposes of property distribution, spousal support, or retirement
and death benefits. These considerations may be even more com104
plicated when one takes into account life course.
Even assuming that Obergefell is retroactively applied to nationally recognize marriages that were valid at the place of celebration, questions may arise as to whether the marital boundary
should encompass time since a domestic partnership or civil union was formed. 105 Indeed, this type of question has even arisen in
the context of partners who did not enter into a domestic partnership or civil union, but who have still been judicially interpreted
as having functioned as if married. 106 Indeed, marital couples
may even need to think through the extent to which the otherwise rarely invoked doctrine of common law marriage may be
used to address time outside of formal marriage for purposes of
financial distributions and benefits.
These questions involved in boundary confirmation arise particularly acutely for couples who have migrated from nonmarital
to marital relational forms in a broader context of patchwork or
incremental recognition.
B. MarriageEquality and Marriage Validity
While every marriage must meet a standard of legal validity,
same-sex marriage migrants are more likely to face challenges in

lution: The Connection Between Heteronormativity and Homonormativity, 60 FAM.
RELATIONS 562, 564 (2011). See generally KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE
CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND LAW (2006).
104. Scholarly examinations of life course are particularly important in finding helpful
social, legal, and policy interventions. See, e.g., Corinne Reczek et al., Commitment Without Marriage: Union FormationAmong Long-Term Same-Sex Couples, 30 J. FAM. ISSUES
738, 738-39 (2009) ("Using a life course perspective ... the authors examine how couples
conceptualize and form committed relationships despite being denied the right to marry.").
105. Deborah H. Wald, PracticingLGBT Family Law in a Post-Obergefell World, FAM.
ADVOC., Spring 2016, at 19. Allison Anna Tait has discussed enlarging the marital pie by
marking the time of marriage's beginning using indicators of legal intent of partnership,
like domestic partnerships or civil unions. Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH.
L. REV. 1245, 1306 (2015).
106. FRANKE, supra note 64, at 213. For now, I do not address the underlying question
of whether this type of marital ascription is desirable. I only highlight this as the kind of
boundary work that couples must do.

2019]

TRANSITIONAL EQUALITY

1175

this regard, due to having sought multiple forms of legal recognition prior to being able to obtain a nationally recognized legal
marriage. These include domestic partnerships, civil unions, or
marriages that were valid in the place of celebration but not in
the place of the couple's domicile.
A key example of marriage equality's interaction with marital
validity is in the context of relationships that remain legally valid
at the time a new marriage is formed. Consider this example.
Party A was previously in a marriage pre-Obergefell to Party X
that was valid in the State Y where the marriage ceremony was
performed, but not in State Z where the couple lived. Because
recognition of same-sex marriage is barred by public policy in
state Z, Party A and Party X cannot obtain a divorce, nor can they
divorce in State Y, because of the typical durational residency requirement necessary for divorce jurisdiction in that state. 10 7 Because of this barrier, Party A never divorces. Party A then meets
and marries Party B post-Obergefell. Based on retroactivity principles, the marriage to Party X is likely still valid, and Party A
has entered into a legally invalid, bigamous marriage with Party
B. While there are likely curative measures that Party A can pursue to confirm the boundaries of her current marriage and extinguish claims arising from her prior marriage, she must engage in
a process to pursue these options.10 8
Boundary confusion may similarly influence Party A's marriage with Party B, even if Party A's prior relationship with Party
X is a domestic partnership or civil union. This may happen if
Party A is unable to dissolve her prior domestic partnership or
civil union, which many states may still recognize even after
marriage equality.109
C. Contract'sEnd and Marriage'sBeginning
Outside of a marital context, same-sex couples have commonly
sought legal protection through contract in the effort to define the
scope of benefits and obligations between intimate partners. 110
107. Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1-2
(2012); Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction:Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2011).
108. Wald, supra note 105, at 22.
109. Id. at 20.
110. MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE'S PROMISES: How FORMAL & INFORMAL CONTRACTS
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Alongside this, United States jurisdictions have increasingly recognized contracts between premarital and marital partners. The
relationship between contract and marriage plays an important
role in marital boundary confirmation.
As I discuss elsewhere, legal status expectations of marriage
may not be entirely well-suited to all couples-regardless of the
sex/gender of the marital partners.1 1 1 A key example is in the context of financial affairs. Further empirical research is needed concerning the roles of race and gender in financial arrangements of
couples. The norm of financial partnership that undergirds the
equitable distribution regime in property distribution at divorce
may not correspond with the arrangements of all couplesdifferent- or same-sex, especially when one takes into account
race and gender. For instance, some research suggests that the
financial arrangements of different-sex African American married
couples and same-sex African American female couples displays
greater independence than different-sex, particularly white, couples. 112
And while premarital and marital agreements concerning financial affairs fall within the realm of the enforceable, so long as
they do not pertain to child support, couples who have been in
long-standing relationships may also seek to instantiate their
long-standing agreements regarding conduct in their relationships. 113 To the extent that contracts pertain to conduct, couples

SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES 111-52 (2015); Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 101, 116-41 (2016); Martha M. Ertman, Marital Contracting in a Post-Windsor World, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479, 506 (2014).
111.

SUZANNE A. KIM, MARRIAGE EQUALITIES (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author).

112. Id. (discussing Mignon R. Moore, Independent Women: Equality in AfricanAmerican Lesbian Relationships, in FAMILIES AS THEY REALLY ARE 214, 214 (Barbara J.
Risman ed., 2010)). Indeed, this dynamic may also be pronounced in different-sex American couples. Catherine T. Kenney, The Power of the Purse:Allocative Systems and Inequality in Couple Households, 20 GENDER & Soc'Y 354, 376-77 (2006). Of course, it is unclear
whether norms of financial independence will persist if more same-sex couples marry and
experience the legal and financial protections that marital recognition brings. Deborah A.
Widiss, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships:New Possibilitiesfor Research on the
Role of Marriage Law in Household Labor Allocation, 8 J. FAM. THEORY & REV. 10, 25
(2016).
113. For example, Edward Stein has discussed the disparate impact of adultery laws on
couples engaging in consensual nonmonogamy. Stein has argued that this disproportionality is likely to include male, same-sex couples. Edward Stein, Same-Sex Couples, the Future of Marriage, and Consensual Non-Monogamy, Presentation at Association of American Law Schools, Section on Family and Juvenile Law Panel on the Future of Marriage
(Jan. 4, 2015).
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are likely to encounter difficulty regarding enforceability. 1 1 4 In
the transition from nonmarital to marital status, these questions
are likely ones that involve substantial engagement with the legal system.
D. MaritalParenting
Relationally transitioning couples must also confirm the
boundary between parentage and marital status. While marriage
creates a stronger legal status for same-sex couples, it does not
secure parentage rights by itself. This is because marital and
parentage statuses are not legally commensurate, at least when
applied to a broader range of families.
Couples moving into marriage encounter a legal landscape favoring different-sex and biologically connected parents. 115 Even
for couples who become parents in the context of marriage, as opposed to moving into marriage after becoming parents, parentage
law unequally recognizes parental status. Take, for example, the
marital presumption, pursuant to which, historically, a man married to a woman giving birth to a child, is presumed to be the father of that child.1 16 Marriage equality has assisted in forging
parentage status, but this assistance is incomplete at best. First,
even if the wording of state law marital presumptions is altered
to apply to a "spouse" instead of just to a "husband," this revision
does nothing to assist fathers in same-sex couples.1 1 7 And even as
applied to same-sex mothers, some states' resistance to the equal
application of marital presumptions has been significant. 118 This
poses significant process burdens, to be discussed in the next

114. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT §10 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N
2012).
115. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017).
116. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 228 (2006); Courtney G.
Joslin, NurturingParenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127 YALE L.J.F. 589, 594 (2018).
117. Nancy D. Polikoff, Marriage as Blindspot: What Children with LGBT Parents
Need Now, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY: THE FUTURE OF LGBT RIGHTS 127 (Carlos A.
Ball ed., 2016); NeJaime, supra note 115, at 2312, 2339. NeJaime describes the legal biases in parentage law faced by parents using assisted reproductive technology. Id. at 2265-66.
118. Polikoff, supra note 117, at 130.
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part, even for couples who live in states recognizing marital pre11 9
sumptions for female same-sex couples.
Moreover, for couples moving into marriage while still planning
to expand their families or who have become parents before marriage, marital transition raises important status dynamics. For
instance, parents may mistakenly believe that getting married
cures legal uncertainty over parentage of children prior to the
marriage.1 20 This would be understandable, given the characterization of marriage equality as fundamental to securing parent22
child relationships.1 2 1 Whether this arises due to socio-politicall
23
the legal
or to doctrinal framing in constitutional discourse,1
24
consciousness challenges1 here are significant and expose risks
for parents crossing status borders. The marital presumption fails
to assist these parents, as the presumption is doctrinally inapt in
the absence of a contemporaneously birthing mother and marital
spouse. Similarly, for couples raising children of prior (heterosexual) relationships, which characterizes a large number of families
of color, 12 5 marriage would have no effect on securing greater parither female or male.1 26
entage status for spouses
The latest revisions to the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA")
make significant progress toward addressing inequities in parentage law based on the application of biological and gender distinctions. 12 7 These changes reflect a deliberate focus on "recogniz12 8
They
ing and protecting functional parent-child relationships."
include the elimination of gender distinctions in the "holding-out
provision," introduction of "de facto parent" status as a means of
establishing parentage, expansion of the classes of people eligible
to establish parent status through state "voluntary acknowledgment processes (VAP)" to include those beyond genetic fathers,
and provision of greater guidance to courts on how to determine

119. NeJaime, supra note 115, at 2295.
120. Polikoff, supra note 117, at 130.
121. Id. at 131-32.
122. See Joslin, supra note 116, at 611-12.
, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015).
123. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
124. Joslin, supra note 116, at 611.
125. Polikoff, supra note 117, at 128.
126. Id. at 139.
127. Joslin, supra note 116, at 602. Doug NeJaime has comprehensively surveyed the
legal treatment of parents in connection to various forms of ART, revealing the law's prioritization of biological and different-sex parents. NeJaime, supra note 115, at 2288-90.
128. Joslin, supra note 116, at 599.
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parentage in the face of competing claims by focusing on factors
rooted in "social bonds." 129 The UPA reforms also aim to eliminate
gender distinctions through using gender-neutral terminology,
making the means of establishing parentage gender-neutral, and
updating the marital presumption, including broadening its application to beyond husbands of women. 3 0
These UPA reforms, if adopted by states, would mark substantial progress toward correcting in state law systems gender- and
sexuality-based inequities in parentage law, including for those in
the marital context. 13 1 Although the UPA has been highly influential, with about half of states having adopted versions of it in
the past, 132 legal indeterminacy is still likely to inform the legal
status transition process for many families in the near- and longterm. Moreover, the UPA's continued focus on genetics and gestation is likely to favor certain forms of parentage over othersdisparately affecting those families and individuals forming families apart from biological connection. 133
Even in contexts of marriage, biology and gender-based distinctions continue to inform the security of parentage status, requiring high levels of procedural engagement. Reaching this point of
engagement to pursue status adjustments like costly and burdensome second-parent adoptions demands heightened legal awareness and considerable social and financial resources. The equality-promising status of marriage in the legal and political
landscape can obscure continued needs for boundary confirmation
work for parents crossing the marital border. 134 Attention to the
process of relational transition helps identify the range of factors
that can bolster parents crossing the marital border.

129. Id. at 601-05.
130. Id. at 606-08.
131. Id. at 595 (discussing Pavan v. Smith, 582 U.S. _, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017); Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. _, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. _135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)).
132. 'The UPA has been quite influential, shaping parentage law in over half the
states in this country since it was originally promulgated in 1973." Courtney Joslin & Jamie Pedersen, Updated National Uniform ParentageAct (UPA 2017) Approved, ASRM
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/XKA5-DHYQ].
133. Joslin describes the continued focus on gender and biology. Joslin, supra note 116,
at 609 ("Except in cases involving surrogacy, the woman who gave birth to a child is automatically considered a parent."); see also id. at 608-10 (drawing distinction between gestational and genetic surrogacy).
134. Polikoff, supra note 69, at 28-29.
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E. The Meaning of MarriageEquality
Boundary confusion also takes form through ongoing contests
over the very meaning of marriage equality itself. Continued resistance to equal marriage rights raises process-based questions
separate and apart from the substantive legal arguments asserted and disputed. Obergefell was decisive in its articulation that
the constitution requires equality in access to marriage. Despite
Obergefell's clarity, the scope of marriage equality continues to be
challenged in states. In contexts of parentage, public accommodations, and employment, opponents of marriage equality have continued to resist it in cases that have been considered by the United States Supreme Court, advancing bizarrely cramped
conceptions of marriage equality.135
Supreme Court cases following Obergefell, from Pavan v.
Smith, to Pidgeon v. Turner, to Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, tell a story of resistance to the scope of
marriage equality at the state and municipal level. In Pavan, a
married female same-sex couple challenged the Arkansas Department of Health's refusal to list both women as parents on
state-issued birth certificates, pursuant to the state's statute governing birth certificates.1 3 6 This refusal occurred in contrast with
the state's presumptive listing of a husband of a birth mother on
the birth certificate, even if that husband is not genetically tied to
the child, such as when a child is conceived through artificial in-

135. In a separate work, I analyze the different paths taken post-Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967), and post-Obergefell and the import of these different paths for interracial marriage and same-sex marriage comparatively in United States law. Suzanne A.
Kim, Loving After Marriage Equality (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). As
described there, after Loving, state court litigation involving the scope of its holding was
sparse. This did not mean that interracial marriage was celebrated socially or legally. Indeed, scholars write about the persistence of intimate segregation and the causes, including legal ones, for this. Despite this continued resistance to interracial intimacy, Loving's
import was accepted in the context of adoption, trusts and estates, and family law. In contrast, the current legal moment has given rise to repeated and far-reaching judicial, governmental, and legislative efforts to constrain Obergefell's reach, reading the case in exceedingly narrow terms or attempting merely to ignore it. This occurs also alongside
increased social acceptance of same-sex marriage across a variety of demographic groups
in the United States.
137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017). ARK. CODE ANN. §
136. Pavan v. Smith, 582 U.S. _,
20-18-401(e) (2014) specifies, "For the purposes of birth registration the mother is deemed
to be the woman who gives birth to the child." ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1) specifies
the name of [her]
"If the mother was married at the time of either conception or birth ...
husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child."
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semination using a sperm donor. 137 The state had argued, and the
Arkansas Supreme Court had agreed, that the holding in Obergefell that same-sex couples are entitled to the "constellation of
benefits that the States have linked to marriage" 138 did not include being listed on a child's birth certificate. 139 In its per curiam
decision, the United States Supreme Court strongly disagreed,
determining that it was clear that the state law used birth certificates to mark more than biological connection, but to "give married parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to
unmarried parents." 140 The Court continued, "[h]aving made that
choice, Arkansas may not, consistent with Obergefell, deny married same-sex couples that recognition." 14 1
In the context of employment, the provision of same-sex spousal benefits continues to be contested. In Pidgeon v. Turner,142 taxpayers sought to challenge the City of Houston's decision to provide benefits, based on Obergefell, to the same-sex spouses of city
employees, as it did for employees with different-sex spouses. The
Texas Supreme Court vacated a trial court injunction that would
have barred the benefits provision, but also remanded the case
back to the trial court to determine whether Obergefell requires
that "states must provide the same publicly funded benefits to all
married persons."1 43 The United States Supreme Court recently
denied the petition for review, leaving the case to work its way
back through the state court.1 44
Resistance to marriage equality continues in the public accommodations setting through Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission.145 The case addresses a bakery's claim
that its free exercise of religion and free speech rights are being
violated by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's decision that

'

137. Pavan, 582 U.S. at -, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 ("Echoing the court below, the State defends its birth-certificate law on the ground that being named on a child's birth certificate
is not a benefit that attends marriage.").
138. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. -, -, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
139. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 176-77 (Ark. 2016).
140. Pavan, 582 U.S. at
137 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
141. Id. at , 137 S. Ct. at 2079.
142. 538 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. 2017), cert. denied, 583 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 505 (2017) (mem.).
143. Id. at 87.
144. Turner, 583 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 505 (mem.).
145. 584 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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the state's antidiscrimination law barred the bakery from refus14 6
ing to provide service for a same-sex couple's wedding.
Access to marriage remains disputed through state legislation,
like the sweeping Mississippi House Bill 1523,147 the constitu1 4 8 The
tionality of which the Supreme Court declined to review.
statute allows government officials, private businesses, and some
medical and social service providers to withhold assistance or
service based on beliefs that: (1) "[m]arriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman"; (2) "[s]exual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage"; and (3) "[m]ale
(man) or female (woman) refer to an individual's immutable biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at
time of birth."1 49 These provisions directly impact married samesex couples, transgender individuals, and those having sexual relations outside of marriage.
V. PROCESS OF TRANSITION

In the previous section, I briefly highlighted some distinct legal
questions that arise for same-sex couples transitioning into marriage. I touch upon these, not to resolve these questions normatively or even to analyze them extensively, but merely to suggest
the range of legal challenges that face those relationally transitioning in a marriage equality world. Even under conditions of
judicial certainty, this boundary confirmation work is likely to affect same-sex couples uniquely, especially those in longer-term relationships moving into marriage. The stakes are especially high
for marital transition, given that these questions involve financial
affairs, benefits, and children. These questions help define the
scope of marriage and rights of a growing group of relationally
transitioning families.
A range of demographic factors likely influence same-sex couples' experiences of process in relational transition. Different-sex
couples in the United States may not necessarily serve as the
most useful guide for understanding how factors like class and

138 S. Ct. at 1723.
146. Id. at-,
147. H.R. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016).
148. Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 583 U.S.
138 S. Ct. 652 (2018).
149. H.R. 1523 § 2, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016).

_,
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race may affect the process of relational migration for same-sex
couples. For example, while marriage among different-sex couples
in the United States has been observed to be the province of
whiter, wealthier, more educated people,1 50 it is not clear yet
what demographic patterns characterize same-sex marriage migrants. 15 1 Social scientists have already highlighted the importance of examining the significance of race, socioeconomic level, and age on social experiences of marriage. 152
Gender and age will likely play a role in relational transition
experiences, insofar as female same-sex couples are more likely
than male same-sex couples to seek legal or social relational
recognition, including marriage. 153 Moreover, in the United
States, women's lifespans are longer than men's, 154 thus highlighting a potential gender-and-age-related difference in the impacts of relational transition. Lastly, given the gender wage gap
in the United States, economic impacts of relational migration
are likely to affect female couples differently than male couples.15 5
The existence of these significant legal questions gives rise to a
host of process considerations in this context of relational migration. These include legal consciousness, access to justice, uncertainty, and impacts on identity.
A. Legal Consciousness
Lack of information imposes a process burden on anyone moving into a new legal status, but may raise particular issues in the

150. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 19 (2014).

MARKETS:

How INEQUALITY

IS

151. We do know that same-sex couples are more likely to be interracial or interethnic
than different-sex couples. See Gates, supra note 17.
152. Sharon S. Rostosky et al., Same-Sex Couples' Decisions and Experiences of Marriage in the Context of Minority Stress: Interviews from a Population-Based Longitudinal
Study, 63 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1019, 1035-37 (2016).
153. van Eeden-Moorefield et al., supranote 103, at 564.
154.

FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON AGING RELATED STATISTICS,

OLDER AMERICANS

2016: KEY INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 26 (2016), https://agingstats.gov/does/LatestReport
/OA2016.pdf [https://perma.ccN57V-VRFL].
155. FAQs About the Wage Gap, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR. (Sept. 2016), https://nwlc.org
/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/FAQ-About-the-Wage-Gap-2016-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3U7
-6SMH]. I defer for another discussion about the impact of cisgender versus transgender
identity on process burden, given the correlation between transgender identity and poverty. M.V. Lee Badgett et al., New Patterns of Poverty in the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
Community, WILLIAMS INST. 2 (June 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/LGB-Poverty-Update-Jun-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA73-9BVP].
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relational context. While marriage equality importantly marks
equal citizenship, marriage also brings with it a host of legal expectations and obligations. Marriage's commonplace status may
ironically overshadow the depth of its connection to a variety of
legal and regulatory systems. As Lynn Baker and Robert Emery
found in their early, but still influential, research on everyday
knowledge about marriage and divorce, people's knowledge about
the legal terms of marriage and divorce tends to be patchy and
incorrect. 156
Marital transition poses some important challenges in evaluating-and opportunities for future sociolegal research on-legal
consciousness. 15 7 While legal awareness about the technical details of the status of marriage may be low on the whole, this lack
of knowledge may be interpreted as a privilege of heteronormativity. Because of the prominent place of the marriage equality
movement on the modern civil rights agenda, the rights associated with marriage have enjoyed significant attention, especially in
LGBTQ and ally communities. Researchers would do well to revisit Baker's and Emery's work in the context of transition into
marriage by same-sex couples. We do not yet know the broader
demographic patterns of movements into marriage for same-sex
couples post-Obergefell, but differences in race, education, economic status, and other socioeconomic status factors may inform
legal consciousness in relational transition.
While increasing some levels of legal awareness, the role of
marriage in civil rights discourse may also obscure the transitional complexities it poses for important aspects of everyday life.
Engaging the legal system to resolve specific boundary confirmation questions requires the knowledge that these legal issues ex-

156. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
439, 443 (1993) (determining, in part, that people held largely incorrect perceptions of the
legal terms of the marriage contract as embodied in divorce statutes and idealistic expectations about the successes of their own relationships). This marriage exceptionalism relates to the family law exceptionalism identified by family law scholar Jill Hasday. Per
Hasday, the legal treatment of interpersonal interactions is often, wrongly, set apart and
placed in a separate category pertaining to family, while existing legal doctrine may easily
resolve legal disputes. JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 15-16 (2014). For a

discussion of exceptionalism in divorce, see Noa Ben-Asher, In the Shadow of a Myth: Bargainingfor Same-Sex Divorce, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1345 (2017).
157.

See, e.g., JASON PIERCESON, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (2013)

("Socio-legal scholars define legal consciousness as a form of legal awareness and activity
by average citizens, as opposed to traditional legal actors.").
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ist to be addressed.15 8 Failure to resolve these legal questions can
substantially affect the health and security of families, socially
and financially. As discussed in the previous section, the effects of
a lack of awareness about the financial and legal implications of
transition into marriage can be even more significant for families
whose lives might be more likely to depart from social norms
against which law is structured. To guard against unwanted legal
outcomes, couples in the process of relational transition face the
particular cost of self-education. They are helped by important efforts of advocacy groups to engage in public education. 159 Even
with marriage equality, however, couples face a continuing process burden, first in self-education to instantiate family connection with alternative mechanisms to marriage, and now within
marriage.
B. Access to Justice
Access to information, discussed previously, is closely tied with
access to justice. The process of determining the boundaries of
marriage for relationally transitioning couples requires legal engagement. Lower- and middle-income relationally transitioning
couples share in bearing the cost of the well-documented civil justice gap in this country, which affects individuals and families
across a range of regulatory domains. 160
Access to justice research demonstrates that the civil justice
gap is especially pronounced for family law matters. For instance,
family law cases comprised the largest percentage of all types of
civil legal assistance provided by Legal Services Corporation
grantees in 2016.161 Moreover, communities of color, immigrants,
women, the elderly, and LGBTQ people are among those more

158. On a related note, Lily Kahng discusses hidden costs associated with marital tax
filing that are little discussed. Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor: The Taxation of Women in Same-Sex Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (2016). For consideration
of role of gender in tax generally, see FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS

(Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2018).
159. Tait, supra note 105.
160. See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET
CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017), https://www.1sc.gov/sites/default

/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/A32V-JBMG].
161. Id. at 39 fig.8.
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likely to require income-based legal assistance in the United
States. 162
The prominent role that marriage has played in efforts to secure equal rights poses a risk of overlooking the need for ongoing
legal assistance in relational transition. Given the complexity of
the range of legal questions raised, the availability of affordable
legal support poses a significant process challenge for middle- and
lower-income families.
C. Costs of Uncertainty
Transition into marriage is the process burden of legal uncertainty occasioned by continued discrimination, and generalized
fear that marriage rights will be reversed due to backlash and
3
ongoing changes in political climate. 16 The feeling of temporariness of legal rights pervades many couples' decisions to marry
and ongoing experiences of marriage. 164 Prevailing responses to
ongoing resistance to marriage equality have focused on bringing
other aspects of formal legal status substantively in line with
governing precedent, such as Obergefell. A focus on the process of
relational transition, however, also brings into closer view the
impacts of uncertainty itself.
Even post-Obergefell, some legal practitioners advise married
couples to carry around documents proving their marital relationship, in case their spousal rights are questioned, for example,
in a hospital setting. 165 Such advice underscores the vulnerability
of legal rights to substantive override. Indeed, as we know, the
path toward and since marriage equality has shown continued resistance, highlighting the frequent gap between formal and substantive equality. Some couples' perception of marriage equality
as provisional resonates with the experience of immigrants or
some American ethnic groups who voice feeling like "perpetual
outsiders," 166 even while legally included in the body politic.

/

8,
162. Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, Making Justice Equal, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec.
2
6
2016, 9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/ 01
12/08/294479/making-justice-equall [https://perma.cc/BFB8-8ZXX].
163. Kim, supra note 1, at 982-84, 1005.
164. Id. at 1005.
165. Wald, supra note 105, at 20.
166. See Michael Luo, An Open Letter to the Woman Who Told My Family to Go Back to
China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/nyregion/to-the-
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A focus on uncertainty as a sociolegal phenomenon rebuts the
narrative of rights as fixed and binary. It enables wide-ranging
and detailed consideration of uncertainty's impacts across a range
of domains. These can include relational, individual, and community effects in psychological, legal, political, and other social
spheres. For instance, we might ask how uncertainty affects one's
relationship, one's choices regarding family formation or economic
arrangement, one's psychological feelings of security, and one's
experiences of inclusion. We might consider how uncertainty is
mediated by race, gender, education, and economic status.
One entry point into this conversation about uncertainty is
through the robust social scientific literature on minority stress,
which focuses on the negative psycho-social and health impacts of
stigmatization of a broad range of groups. 16 7 A recent intervention
in this regard arose in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case. 168 Pursuant to this argument, permitting exemptions to antidiscrimination law that otherwise protect sexual minorities dangerously exacerbates minority stigma. 169 A stronger interdisciplinary
conceptualization of uncertainty would look more closely at the
legal and psycho-social impacts of ongoing uncertainty itself, even
or especially in connection with established legal status claims.
Focusing on the process burden of uncertainty enables deeper
examination of ways toward more responsive approaches to social
resilience and relational health, 170 in the gaps between substantive and formal equality.

woman-who-told-my-family-to-go-back-to-china.html [https://perma.cc/2XHG-M89F] (describing the experiences of Asian Americans as being treated as perpetual foreigners in
the United States).
167. See, e.g., Ilan H. Meyer & David M. Frost, Minority Stress and the Health of Sexual Minorities, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION (Charlotte J. Pat-

terson & Anthony R. D'Augelli eds., 2013); Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress and
Mental Health in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations: Conceptual Issues and Research
Evidence, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 674, 674-75 (2003); Rostosky, supra note 152, at 1021-22;
Brandon L. Velez et al., Minority Stress and Racial or Ethnic Minority Status: A Test of
the Greater Risk Perspective, 4 PSYCHOL. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER DIVERSITY 257,

258 (2017).
168. Brief of Amici Curiae Ilan H. Meyer, PhD & Other Social Scientists & Legal
Scholars Who Study the LGB Population in Support of Respondents at 9, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U.S. -, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16111).
169. Id. at 3.
170. See Holning Lau, Beyond Our Hearts: The Ecology of Couple Relationships, 4
CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 155, 157-59 (2013) (discussing research on impact of environment surrounding a relationship on its health).
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D. Social Norms
Families transitioning into marriage may encounter impacts
from dominant social norms and enduring prejudice. These could
arise in the context of relational impacts. As I discuss in Relational Migration,17 1 families transitioning into marriage may encounter impacts on self, on their relationship, and with broader
communities. While some are expected, like greater feelings of inclusion, other impacts are more surprising, such as unanticipated
tensions that may arise with families of origin. 172 As Lee Badgett
has shown, even increased feelings of inclusion may vary based
on other factors-like race, gender, and strength of relationship
with one's family of origin. 17 3
As alluded to above, people transitioning into marriage also encounter social norms that govern marriage's legal structure.
While not necessarily evident immediately upon marriage, the
law that undergirds property distribution in most statesequitable distribution-proceeds from an assumption that property is shared, and intended to be shared, by marital partners.
What if couples who have always kept their property separate
and intend to remain doing so even after they marry? If they do
not take legal action to switch away from this default, their earnings during marriage are treated as marital property, subject to
distribution. Noted above, some research suggests that the defaults upon which property distribution rules are not necessarily
well-founded across a range of couples. 174 Financial arrangements
may vary based on race, with Catherine T. Kenney's work suggesting more independent financial arrangement among African
American different-sex couples than among white different-sex

171. Kim, supra note 1, at 985.
172. See Abigail Ocobock, The Power and Limits of Marriage:Married Gay Men's Family Relationships, 75 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 191, 195, 198 (2013) (finding in interviews during 2010 and 2011 with gay married men in Iowa, that while two-thirds of men perceived
that "getting legally married had a positive impact on their relationships with families of
origin," half of the men interviewed (the same men who reported positive outcomes) also
reported "some kind of negative experience with families of origin surrounding their marriages" including "re-experiencing rejection from already unsupportive family members" or
"new experiences of rejection from family members who had previously seemed supportive").
173. See M.V. Lee Badgett, Social Inclusion and the Value of Marriage Equality in
Massachusetts and the Netherlands, 67 J. Soc. ISSUES 316, 331-32 (2011) (exploring experiences of same-sex married couples in the Netherlands and Massachusetts).
174. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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couples.1 75 Mignon Moore's-work has also suggested more financial independence among African American lesbian couples than
among white couples. 176
Social norms and legal defaults may also be mismatched more
generally for same-sex couples. Some United States data suggest
that at least male same-sex couples may be more likely to follow
norms of equal contribution to various household expenses, compared to different-sex couples.17 7 United Kingdom research indicates that same-sex couples may pursue more diverse financial
arrangements than different-sex couples,1 78 including less "merging" of finances, but instead partially pooling money or managing
money independently.1 79
Such encounters with social norms driving legal defaults, if
they are even known, 1s0 to the extent they do not correspond with
lived experience and intention, require time, attention, and resources. These are part of the processes of marital transition that
may go underappreciated. If such process encounters are not attended, financial repercussions can be serious for couples later.

VI. BUILDING TRANSITIONAL EQUALITY
What does a focus on transitional equality mean for law and
policy? What do we gain from this perspective? Again, this focus
on transitional equality aims to examine the process of transition
across legal status categories and the opportunities for fostering
greater resilience. The process of relational status transition, as
discussed in this context, is but one example. It is particularly
useful, however, for revealing the many dimensions of any legal

175. Catherine T. Kenney, The Power of the Purse:Allocative Systems and Inequality in
Couple Households, 20 GENDER & SoCY 354, 375-76 (2006).
176. Mignon R. Moore, Independent Women: Equality in African-American Lesbian Relationships, in FAMILIES AS THEY REALLY ARE 214, 216-17 (Barbara J. Risman ed., 2010).
177. Gabrielle Gotta et al., Heterosexual, Lesbian, and Gay Male Relationships: A
Comparisonof Couples in 1975 and 2000, 50 FAM. PROCESS 353, 364-65 & tbl.4 (2011).
178.

M.V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF

LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 147 (2001); Maree Burns et al., FinancialAffairs? Money Management in Same-Sex Relationships, 37 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 481, 487 (2008).
179. Carole Burgoyne et al., Money Management and Views of Civil Partnership in
Same-Sex Couples: Results from a UK Survey of Non-Heterosexuals, 59 SOC. REV. 685, 703
(2011); Burns et al., supra note 178, at 497.
180. For a discussion about legal awareness, see supra Part V.A.
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status transition, at the levels of formal law, social norms and
dynamics, and lived experience.
Who bears and should bear the costs of relational status transition? Partially due to the promise that access to formal equality
represents, the range of process aspects of these status transitions may be underappreciated in broader discourse. Certainly,
identifying the costs of process (or their accompanying impacts on
substantive equality), is never meant to defeat claims for formal
equality.1 8 1 But examining experiences in traversing the marital
border provides an important opportunity to consider how we
might bolster individuals and families through important status
change by engaging the state and social institutions. Hidden process costs of relational transition may undermine the equality
couples seek, by giving rise to unwanted legal and financial obligations due to boundary indeterminacy.
Sociolegalism provides a broad framework in which to consider
paths toward the pursuit of everyday equality in transitional contexts. Concepts of procedural justice facilitate an evaluation of
how process may bolster or undermine experiences of formal
equality. Vulnerability theory highlights differential access to social assets, including through legal regimes that may buffer indi182
viduals, relationships, and communities.
In the previous parts, I identify some distinct legal challenges
that those transitioning into marriage face and the process challenges associated with addressing those questions. Efforts to bolster resilience and foster a more fulsome vision of rights for relationally transitioning families should address the range of process
burdens identified. I will explore proposals more fully in this section, from theoretical, doctrinal, policy, and research perspectives.
A. Theory
How do we build resilience to create transitional equality within a framework of everyday equality? Sociolegalism, procedural
181. See Kim, supra note 1, at 991.
182. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 20, at 8-10; FINEMAN, AUTONOMY, supra
note 20, at 8-10. 'This theory's attention to the condition of universal vulnerability, including for historically marginalized communities, and its attendant focus on encouraging
greater social strength or capacity in the face of that vulnerability, provides a particularly
generative framework for identifying opportunities for increasing resilience in relational
migration." Kim, supra note 1, at 989.
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justice, and vulnerability theory each provide conceptual tools for
doing so independently, and as related to one another. The analysis of transitional equality also provides opportunities for theoretical expansion in each of these domains.
Sociolegalism's view of law and social context as mutually constitutive provides a foundation for theorizing the everyday aspect
of equality.1 83 The quotidian nature of equality, or lack thereof,
finds purchase in the sociolegal concept of law on the books and
law as lived. Within this, transitional equality expands our understanding of equality as rooted in legal transition processes of
families. This latter consideration allows us to pursue the transitional dynamics that are present through formal status change
processes, highlighting questions of distributive justice contained
therein. 184
Picking up on the thread of a socially implicated, and decentered law, procedural justice permits closer inquiry into the social
and psychological impacts of legal systems through a holistic perspective. 18 5 Transitional equality finds a home in procedural justice's more capacious understanding of what counts as process
and also in its centering of individual experience. 186 While individual perceptions of and encounters with legal systems serve as
departure points for analysis, transitional equality can push for
developing more responsive, overarching system design that will
ensure enduring, and equitable, social change.18 7
Vulnerability theory provides a basis for envisioning systemic
responses to address change that occurs connected to universal,
human vulnerability. 188 Transitional equality conceives of that
inevitable change in social, rather than bodily, terms.18 9 This
framing enables us to consider what social forces inform and impel relational change and how that change is understood and experienced. Resilience, as articulated through vulnerability theory,
strengthens the experience of change, which as I argue, includes
relational status change. 190 The social capacity of resilience, built
183.

See supra Part III.A.

184.

See supra Part I.B.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
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through more responsive social institutions, inures to the benefit
of individuals, communities, and society at large.
These theoretical frameworks help to draw out relational status transition as a subject of inquiry unto itself. The dynamic relationship between doctrinal and process questions that arise in
marital transition provide a rich opportunity to push the concepts
grounding sociolegalism, procedural justice, and vulnerability
theory even farther.
B. Doctrine
What does it mean to reinforce transitional equality in the law?
Legal doctrine provides some building blocks for better recognition and support of equality in transition. Specifically, bolstering
access to justice provides an important mechanism for building
transitional equality, premised on resilience. Procedural due process, equal protection, and substantive due process doctrine provide some opportunity to support access to justice in the relationship status transition context.
1. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process doctrine provides an opportunity to
build transitional equality. Cases on access to courts and civil legal assistance provide useful tools developing systemic resilience
for relational status transition.
a. Access to Courts
Boddie v. Connecticut, addressing access to courts, vindicates
an interest in transitional equality through its focus on protecting
the opportunity to be heard to adjust relational status (i.e., marital status). Plaintiff welfare recipients challenged state procedures as applied for commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of
process, that restricted access to courts in efforts to bring a divorce action. The average cost for litigation for bringing a divorce
action was $60.191 According to the plaintiffs, the court fees re-

191.

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372 (1971).
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stricted their access to divorce and violated procedural due process rights.
Plaintiffs analogized their position to that of defendants facing
exclusion from the only forum in which they can settle their disputes. While plaintiffs in divorce actions voluntarily instituted legal action, unlike defendants who have no control over what
plaintiffs do, the Court blurred the distinction between the voluntariness and non-voluntariness of the litigant plaintiffs' orientation toward the court. While the plaintiffs undertook action to obtain divorces, being in court was not truly voluntary because
persons who want divorce have no option but to bring legal action
for divorce. 192
Boddie is instructive from a transitional equality perspective,
however, even in instances when people are not seeking divorce.
The monopoly that courts have over relational transition from
married to unmarried extends to other relational transitions as
well, such as from unmarried to married. The long shadow that
judicial regulation casts over all relationship statuses means that
any adjustment necessarily involves legal entanglementwhether at the relationship's beginning or end. 19 3 Transitional
equality suggests, then, a need for equal access to judicial remedies to make relational adjustments.
b. Civil Legal Assistance
The legal questions that arise connected to marital status transition are ones that require legal expertise. Constitutional law's
approach to civil legal assistance in the family context contains
inherent contradictions. It both recognizes the importance of procedural protection in civil contexts (and even in the law of family)

192. While other parties, like those in a contract dispute, would have the option for private settlement of claims, those seeking divorce must pursue a legal proceeding. As a person seeking a divorce must "invok[e] State's judicial machinery" to get a divorce, the state
has a monopoly over the ability to adjust one's legal status this way. Id. at 376. While the
Court does not conclude that there is a fundamental right to divorce, it does say that obtaining a divorce is important because marriage is deemed central to private life. Id. at
371 ("[Mlarriage involves interests of basic importance in our society.").
193. The Court tells us that "due process requires . . . that absent a countervailing
state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and
duty through the judicial process must be given meaningful opportunity to be heard." Id.
at 377.
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but denies the need for this protection to come in the form of legal
assistance.
The "civil Gideon" movement seeks to address needs for legal
assistance in important civil contexts, 194 building on the foundational Gideon v. Wainright, guaranteeing a right to appointed
counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases as a Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process matter. 195 While there has
been increasingly vigorous emphasis within legal, research, and
policy communities on the importance of civil legal assistance,
guarantees of such are substantially constrained by doctrine, specifically the Supreme Court's holding in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services of Durham County.196
In the case, petitioner Abby Lassiter lost custody of her son
William when he was adjudicated neglected and put in the county's custody. She was subsequently convicted of second-degree
murder (unrelated to her son William). The county Department of
Social Services petitioned to terminate Lassiter's parental
rights.1 97 At the point that the Department of Social Services
sought to terminate her parental rights, Lassiter had already lost
physical custody but was still William's parent. Significantly,
Lassiter was not represented during the parental termination
hearing. And, not surprisingly, the state trial court terminated
her parental rights. 198

194. Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won't Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106, 2108
(2013) ("The term 'civil Gideon' now commonly serves as a shorthand for the idea that the
right to appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants recognized in Gideon should be
extended to civil cases involving interests of a sufficient magnitude."); see also Debra
Gardner, Pursuing a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Introduction and Overview, 40
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 167, 168 (2006); Steven D. Schwinn, The
Right to Counsel on Appeal: Civil Douglas, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 603, 603 n.2
(2006).
195. 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
196. 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
197. These grounds included that she had not had contact with the child since December 1975, she willfully left William in foster care for more than two years without progressing toward reuniting with him and failed to show positive response to the county's
efforts to strengthen her relationship with the child or to make and follow through with
plans for William's future. Id. at 20-21.
198. Id. at 23-24. After the state trial court terminated her parental rights, Lassiter
appealed to the intermediate state appellate court, which affirmed the termination. Lassiter appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which denied her application for discretionary review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider her
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim. Id. at 24. Lassiter was able to manage these
appeals through a legal aid attorney she eventually obtained. Id. at 19.
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In analyzing Lassiter's procedural due process claim, the Court
applies a presumption that indigent litigants have a right to
counsel only when faced with potential loss of physical liberty.199
Against this presumption, the Court weighs the three procedural
due process analysis factors of Mathews v. Eldridge-riskof error
and government interest with the private interest at stake. 200
While the Court assesses the private interest in threatened loss of
parental rights as great, it views it as less significant than a
threatened loss of physical liberty. The Court weighs the state's
interest in welfare of the child and in saving fiscal resources, 20 1
noting potential alignment between the state and the parent
based on appointed counsel being able to assist in obtaining an
accurate decision for the child's welfare. Lastly, the Court
weighed the risk of error as high, especially due to lack of education and the general distressing nature of the legal issue at stake.
With this analysis recognizing the great interests at stake,
alignment between the parent and the state, and the high risk of
error, the Court seemed poised to embrace a constitutional right
to a lawyer in at least this civil context. So why the bait and
switch to deny a procedural right to counsel?
The Court portrayed the procedural due process analysis as a
"case by case determination" left in the first instance to the trial
court. The Court concluded that the Mathews factors could not be
distributed the same way in all cases, requiring more fact-specific
inquiry. Oddly enough, however, rather than send the case back
to the trial court to determine whether Lassiter was entitled to
assistance of counsel, the Court undertook the trial court's work
itself, determining that Lassiter was not entitled to an attor-

199.
200.
201.
process

Id. at 26-27.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
The Court noted that fiscal interests cannot determine the scope of procedural due
rights or access to constitutional rights. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-28.
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ney. 2 0 2 The case was widely decried as a debilitating setback for
203
progress toward civil justice protection.
How can transitional equality shift the frame around Lassiter?
While the Mathews factors applied in Lassiter have themselves
been the subject of sustained criticism, even assuming they are
appropriately applied, a lens of transitional equality helps us understand various interests and dynamics at stake more broadly.
The Court defined Lassiter's interest as one of loss of parental
rights, engaging in a dichotomous weighing of the significance of
loss of physical liberty as compared to loss of parental rights.
If Lassiter's status as a parent is to have meaning, however,
this means the ability to keep that status secure as well. Lost in a
narrow focus on how important parental rights are compared to
physical liberty rights, the case reveals Lassiter's independent interest in equality in passage across the legal status boundary
from parent to nonparent. Taken seriously, parties facing such
kinds of status changes (in this case, a parental status change)
deserve a means to buffer the various costs and dangers faced
through this process. Parental or other legal status rights matter
not just because of what they mean in an absolute, or isolated,
sense but because of what they mean in connection to surrounding dynamic forces that shape, define, and inform them.
Within a framework of transitional equality, which demarcates
multidimensional space around and through rights, the ability to
secure rights in the first instance and to maintain them going
forward matters. Lassiter's right as a parent includes the transitional rights associated with this relational status, including in

202. The Court does its own analysis of Mathews factors in this particular case of Lassiter. The keys to the Court's analysis were risk of error and parental interest. The Court
concluded that there was a low risk of error with no especially troublesome points of law
and determining that counsel would not have made a difference, given the weight of evidence that Lassiter had "few sparks of such an interest" in rekindling her relationship
with her son. Id. at 32-33. Moreover, the Court concluded that Lassiter's interest at stake
was low, with her "plain demonstration that she [was] not interested in attending a hearing." Id. at 33.
203. See e.g. Brooke D. Coleman, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: Why Is It
Such a Lousy Case, 12 NEV. L.J. 591 (2012); Robert Hornstein, The Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases Revisited: The ProperInfluence of Poverty and the Case for Reversing Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 1057 (2010). I do not enter here the
robust scholarly conversation about whether Mathews was rightly decided or whether the
factors enunciated there were appropriate. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge, 44
U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
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the face of relationship status transitions, whether voluntary or
coerced. A case-by-case approach-apart from the way it is applied-overlooks interests in transitional equality. It should not
matter from a transitional equality point of view whether the legal issues in the case were difficult or easy, whether Lassiter had
demonstrated many or "few sparks of interest in rekindling interest in her son," 20 4 or whether she attended the termination hearing or not. 2 0 5

Even in the context of the case-by-case analysis, the reason to
which the Court points for its conclusion that Lassiter possesses a
diminished private right-that she did not attend the termination
hearing 206-highlights the very reason why she was entitled to an
attorney. Even in her incarcerated state, legal assistance could
have made a difference to Lassiter in facing the potential relationship status transition by enabling her to attend the very hearing she was faulted for not attending. Transitional equality further pierces the fiction upon which Lassiter is based-that her
private interests and her risk of error were diminished because of
actions Lassiter failed to take of her own individual, autonomous
volition. While the confusion and distress that any parent would
likely face when confronting the prospect of termination is, of
course, serious, the framing of her interests solely in reference to
its severity as compared to physical liberty devalues the ways in
which Lassiter, and others facing relational status transition, are
not merely individual actors but persons whose lives reveal and
are informed by a variety of social forces and coercions. An emphasis on transitional equality brings to bear all the ways legal
assistance matters and the ways in which she and others can be
impaired in their relationship status transitions-whether due to

204. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32.
205. The Court's assessment of Lassiter's private interest as diminished by her failure
to attend the parental termination hearing overlooks the fact that Lassiter was incarcerated at the time and did not know about the proceeding. Id. at 20-21. Justice Blackmun,
in dissent, objected to the idea of a case-by-case approach. Id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe issue ... is not petitioner's character; it is whether she was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard when the state moved to terminate absolutely her parental
rights."). This also departs from the effectively substantively-neutral approach to procedural due process as articulated in Goldberg v. Kelly, whereby the strength of claims at
issue does not dictate the scope of procedural due process rights. 397 U.S. 254, 262-63
(1970).
206. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33.
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the nature of the relationship at stake, level of education, legal
issues contained therein, 207 or other social conditions.
2. Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Dialectic
Constitutional cases that operate at the intersection of substantive due process and equal protection highlight the importance of equal access to rights. Cases like Obergefell v. Hodges
occupy this middle ground-what Kerry Abrams and Brandon
Garrett called "intersectional rights" cases-and provide a foun208
dation for considering transitional equality more squarely.
Abrams and Garrett apply Kimberl6 Crenshaw's concept of inter209
sectionality to this domain of constitutional cases.
Abrams and Garrett describe these intersectional rights cases
as those that "involve multiple constitutional claims that gain
meaning when heard together and amplify the cognizable
harm." 2 1 0 These cases can arise across a range of contexts, as described by Abrams and Garrett; the Court's constitutional cases
in the context of intimacy regulation, extending from Griswold v.
Connecticut2 11 to Eisenstadt v. Baird2 12 to United States v. Windsor,2 1 3 they observe, have been especially criticized for failing to
explain the relationship between substantive due process and
equal protection, when the Court relies on both to find a constitutional violation. 214 Abrams and Garrett similarly critique Oberge-

207. The ex ante approach the Court takes to evaluating the risk of error runs entirely
counter to what we know, from a social scientific standpoint, to the ways in which people
understand the law, including in the intimate rights context. A society-based understanding of the legal system, focused on law as lived day-to-day, in everyday people's lives
means that assumptions that legal actors make about law cannot be facilely applied to
"lay" people, especially when one takes into account level of education and other socialeconomic status factors.
208. Abrams and Garrett theorize "cumulative constitutional rights" cases, whereby
"[p]laintiffs litigate multiple constitutional violations, or multiple harms, and judges use
multiple constitutional provisions to inform interpretation." Kerry Abrams & Brandon
Garrett, Cumulative ConstitutionalRights, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1309-10 (2017) (dividing
cases into three categories-aggregate harm, hybrid rights, and intersectional rights).
209. Id. at 1330; Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
210. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 208, at 1330.
211. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
212. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
213. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
214. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 208, at 1312 ("In particular, scholars have criticized
much of the Court's constitutional family jurisprudence-from the contraception cases
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fell v. Hodges for neglecting to specify the link between substantive due process and equal protection 215 in its determination that
barring same-sex couples from marriage was unconstitutional.
In Obergefell, the Court marked a relationship between the
two[t]he Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way ... . In any particular case one Clause may
be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and
comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the
identification and definition of the right. 2 16

Abrams and Garrett argue that cases like Obergefell show different constitutional rights, like due process and equal protection,

as "mutually reinforcing and amplifying." 2 17 The withholding of
the marriage right shows inequality, and the inequality shows
the significance of what is being withheld. Further, "[t]he key to
Obergefell and the other marriage cases is the bundling of multiple substantial government benefits into a legal status of cultural
heft called 'marriage,' and then denying some but not all people
from accessing that status," they observed. 218 "The Court implied
that the discrimination claim and the fundamental rights claim,
standing alone, were not as strong." 219

such as Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird to the more recent LGBT rights
cases such as Lawrence and United States v. Windsor-for failing to specify with adequate
precision the constitutional right at stake." (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation
and the Constitution:A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1988))).
215. Id.
216. 576 U.S.
_ 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015).
217. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 208, at 1315. "Traditionally, substantive due process has protected a limited menu of 'fundamental rights' from government intrusion,
while equal protection has protected individuals against discrimination by the government. But in some cases, these rights have merged." Id. at 1331-32.
218. The opinion then spends a substantial amount of space working through previous
cases in which equal protection and substantive due process have converged. Loving v.
Virginia, the case in which the Court invalidated a ban on interracial marriage, for example, rested on both equal protection and substantive due process principles. The Obergefell
opinion acknowledges Loving's conceptual merging of the two clauses; Loving held that
"[t]o deny this fundamental freedom [of marriage] on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all
the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law." "The reasons why marriage is a
fundamental right," Obergefell explains, "became more clear and compelling from a full
awareness and understanding of the hurt that resulted from laws barring interracial unions." Abrams & Garrett, supra note 208, at 1333-34 (alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted).
219. Id. at 1335.
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A concept of transitional equality helps to bolster the concept of
intersectional rights, which they draw from Pamela Karlan's notion of "stereotypic harm" 2 2 0 and Kenneth Karst's approval of the
Court's "integration of appeals to equality and liberty" as reflecting the Fourteenth Amendment's core concern with equality of
citizenship. 22 1 While a full discussion of the underlying commitments of substantive due process and equal protection lies beyond
the scope of this article, I suggest here that the intersection of
rights in the "fundamental due process" context, largely conceived
of as occupying the space between substantive due process and
equal protection, could also contain a procedural dimension.
The "synergistic" 222 relationship between substantive due process and equal protection, arguably, flows from a process-based
concept of equal or full access. The ability to gain equal access to
something valuable, whether or not it is denoted as a "fundamental right," but even or especially when it is deemed "fundamental," provides a way to think about the relationship between due
process and equal protection. Equal access to a legal status raises
independent and important concerns about fundamental fairness,
which can help advance transitional equality.
Inequality of access also makes itself visible through regulation
of access to the scope of rights already deemed fundamental. For
instance, like Lassiter, the case of M.L.B. v. S.L.J. arises in the
context of a threatened forced shift in relational status, parental
termination. 223 The case strikes down, on due process and equal
protection grounds, a statute "requiring indigent mothers to pay a
224
fee in order to appeal the termination of their parental rights."
While due process does not guarantee a right to appeal, Justice
Ginsburg places the barrier to judicial access in the context of the
225
Karlan obimportance of the threat to parental relationships.
adjubeing
right
the
because
required
was
serves, "Equal access

220. Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474, 480 (2002).
221. Kenneth L. Karst, Those Appealing Indigents: Justice Ginsburg and the Claims of
Equal Citizenship, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 938 (2009).
222. Karlan, supra note 220, at 474.
223. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119-24 (1996).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 102 ("Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in our society,'
rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect."(citations omitted)).

2019]

TRANSITIONAL EQUALITY

1201

dicated in the underlying proceeding was a fundamental one." 2 2 6
If the legal status of parenthood means anything, it includes the
ability to protect this right equally against forced transition out of
this status.
A transitional equality lens helps to bring into sharper focus
the procedural stakes around rights, especially when located at
the intersection of equal protection and due process. For instance,
in Kerry v. Din, the Court denied a petitioner's claim that she had
a constitutional right to reside in the United States with her husband, who was denied a visa, and that her liberty interest in marriage entitled her to a procedural review of the denial. 227 A transitional equality lens could have brought out even more saliently
what Abrams and Garrett describe as the Din claim's
nuanced understanding that procedural interests can affect substantive liberty interests. Din claimed not that she was entitled to family
reunification because of her liberty interest in her marriage, but rather that her liberty interest in her marriage, coupled with her
rights as a U.S. citizen, entitled her to sufficient due process to understand the reasons why her husband was being excluded from the
United States. 228

C. Policy and Infrastructure
The ability to address the legal and associated process burdens
encountered by those in relational transition, like those postObergefell, requires innovation in access to justice policy and infrastructure. Creative problem solving in the justice gap space
would inure to the benefit of the "[o]ver 100 million people in the
United States . . . living with civil justice problems." 229 As discussed above, the civil justice gap is especially pronounced for
family law matters. 2 30 Moreover, communities of color, immigrants, women, the elderly, and LGBTQ people are among those
more likely to require income-based legal assistance in the United
States. This broader picture of the civil justice gap suggests over-

226.
227.
228.

Karlan, supra note 220, at 482-83.
576 U.S. _ _, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2136 (2015) (plurality opinion).
Abrams & Garrett, supra note 208, at 1343.

229.

AM. BAR FOUND., CrvIL JUSTICE PROBLEMS ARE COMMON,

WIDESPREAD, AND

RARELY TAKEN TO A LAWYER (2016), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms
/documents/abf researchbriefaccess.tojustice v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PVB-W4CS].
230. For instance, family law cases comprised the largest percentage of all types of civil
legal assistance provided by Legal Services Corporation grantees in 2016.
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lap between those facing justice problems and same-sex couples
in relational transition into marriage.
Considering the various dimensions of relational status transition, in an intentionally sociolegal fashion, assists us in the effort
to support transitional equality. This multidimensional focus enables us to strike a reasonable balance between responding to the
needs of individuals, families, and communities on one hand and
deterring excessive regulation on the other. This goal requires
multi-pronged solutions that carefully attend to infrastructural
gaps that build capacity and avoid coercion. I discuss some areas
deserving further policy attention in the context of transitional
equality, which will bolster resilience in relational transition.
As previously discussed, family-related needs make up the bulk
of civil legal assistance needs. 2 31 Moreover, as Elizabeth MacDowell has observed, the issues of family are ubiquitous and run
a wide gamut through people's lives, thus providing a revealing
2 32
This
window into the role of access to justice in everyday life.
topical focus and the higher rates of civil justice contact by disadvantaged populations 233 makes for an important opportunity to
bolster transitional equality.
The access to justice conversation in the United States largely
centers on two areas-funding and, relatedly, access to legal
counsel. Efforts to boost pro bono service and the "civil Gideon"
movement are based on the view of legal representation as a
main measure of access to justice. But increasing access to lawyers may not be enough, or the only solution. Rebecca Aviel criticizes the focus on access to lawyers as it applies in the child custody context in family law. 2 34 She argues against relying solely in
family law on the adversarial, lawyer-centered model of addressing access to justice problems, viewed as critical in criminal law,
observing that "[m]ost litigants want proceedings that are short-

231. See supra Part V.B.
232. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Vulnerability, Access to Justice, and the Fragmented
State, 23 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51, 52-53, 56-59 (2018).
233. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Accessing Justice in the Contemporary USA: Findingsfrom
1, 3, 5,
BAR FOUND.
the Community Needs and Services Study, AM.
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur-accessing-justice
in_the contemporary-usa.-aug._2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7B8-4JW5](last visited Apr.
1, 2019).
234. Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won't Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106,
2109-10 (2013).
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er, simpler, cheaper, more personal, more collaborative, and less
adversarial. These are procedural values that are-and should
probably remain-foreign to criminal proceedings." 2 3 5 Aviel's argument may be viewed as a means of bolstering resilience
through relational transition.
Moreover, the sociolegal research of recent MacArthur "genius"
award recipient Rebecca Sandefur highlights the mismatch between the intense focus on funding and on provision of lawyers
and the justice needs of people. Simply funding more lawyers
does not account for the way that people view their legal needs, if
they even view them as legal. As Sandefur has determined, when
Americans are asked about their experiences with problems that
are justiciable, "they often do not think of their justice problems
in legal terms." 2 3 6 They "express a wish for assistance with these
problems, but it is not usually legal assistance that they wish
for." 2 3 7

The case of "Mary," a woman Sandefur interviewed, who faced
foreclosure proceedings on her home, is telling. Mary had quit her
job in order to manage her son's recently diagnosed developmental disorder, and had stopped making her mortgage payments.
She soon became overwhelmed by the foreclosure proceedings.

235.

Id. at 2109. Aviel continues:
[W]e should hesitate before throwing full support behind a civil Gideon initiative for family law, regardless of how wholeheartedly we embrace the proposition that parental rights are as important as physical liberty. Civil Gideon
discourse trades on the gravitas of constitutional criminal procedure but isn't
sufficiently tailored to the unique qualities of family law. These unique qualities challenge us to design custody dispute resolution systems that honor the
constitutionally significant interests at stake while recognizing the truly
unique posture in which separating parents litigate, which is different from
both the criminal context that gave rise to Gideon and the administrative law
context from which the Court's civil due process precedents emerged. To pursue civil Gideon as a stand-alone reform falls short of this challenge. It accepts the primacy of a lawyer-centric

adversary system as the preferred

means for resolving family law disputes in the face of growing evidence that
this framework does more harm than good for most domestic-relations litigants. Civil Gideon responds in an admirable and important way to the unfairness of litigating without a lawyer in a system where lawyers are indisputably necessary. But it doesn't challenge the necessity of lawyers or
envision a world in which parents can resolve their disputes more quickly
and more collaboratively than in lawyer-centered systems.

Id. at 2109-10.
236. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Money Isn't Everything: Understanding Moderate Income
Households' Use of Lawyers' Services, in MIDDLE-INCOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE 222, 233
(Michael Trebilcock et al. eds., 2012).
237. AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 229 (citing Sandefur, supra note 236).
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Mary told Professor Sandefur that the person who gave her the
most helpful advice she had received throughout the entire ordeal
was the process server who served her eviction papers. The process server had simply assured Mary that she had rights, and
2 38
urged her not to let the bank intimidate her.
This encounter "illustrates the disconnection from access to
basic legal assistance that many Americans experience every day,
and shines a light on the value of fundamental and sound advice
239 As Sandefur
given at the moment when it is most needed."
notes, it also "give[s] researchers important insights into the areas where legal assistance programs can intervene, and how we
can design programs that can assist people at the moment when
2 40
they need it most."

Understanding the everyday contexts in which people encounter technically legal problems is crucial for building transitional
equality. As Sandefur has found, despite the assumption that
funding more lawyers should be the focus of access to justice reform, many people may never even reach the point of seeking to
secure a lawyer. As she has found, despite the technical legal
need that may exist, "people [are] least likely to consult attorneys
.

about problems [involving] personal finances, . . . housing, . .
241
And
health care, . . . employment, . . . and community needs."

solutions geared toward increasing access to justice must account
for the broader social context that informs people's orientation
toward problems. For instance, "In a study of poor and moderateincome Americans' experiences with civil justice problems involving money and housing, poor households were twice as likely to
do nothing about such problems as were moderate-income households." 2 4 2 This inaction does not mean that legal problems should
not be addressed; the reasons for the gap between action and in-

238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
Id.

241. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND. & UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN,
CivIL LEGAL NEEDS AND PUBLIC LEGAL UNDERSTANDING 1 (citing Rebecca L. Sandefur,

The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 51
(2010)), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_- civil
legal needs-and-public_1egal-understanding-handout.pdf [https://perma.cclWSF6-SVQW]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
242. Id.
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action must be understood and addressed to create sustained and
effective access to justice solutions. 243
Increasing transitional equality, including for those in relational transition, requires attending to the broader infrastructural landscape of civil legal assistance. Mapping this infrastructure
is an important first step. The civil legal infrastructural landscape in the U.S. is one of numerous, small-scale public-private
partnerships. 2 44 Not surprisingly, "Geography is destiny: the services available to people from eligible populations are determined
by where they happen to live, not by what their civil justice problems [are] ."245 In this context, in order to create true resilience
across legal status categories, especially and including relational
statuses, but also connected to people's other legal problems, we
must address these infrastructural gaps. 2 4 6
In considering system design and more holistic approaches to
building transitional equality, we must also consider what we
mean by effective legal assistance and how our legal institutions
can ambitiously and sensitively address pervasive need. A more
robust effort at building transitional resilience, however, must attend to the limitations of increased funding or legal assistance
provision as main goals of access to justice efforts. We must also
expand what we mean by providing legal assistance. How do we
shift people's orientation toward lawyers and the legal system?
How can we build legal literacy? Without being tethered to legal
institutions qua legal institutions, how can we address transitional equality needs as they arise-in ordinary people's lives?
Innovations in technology, given its embeddedness in everday
life, could assist in bolstering relational transition resilience. 24 7

243.

Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and

Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 112, 112-13,

127-28 (Pascoe Pleasence et al. eds., 2007).
244. AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 229.

245. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, AM. BAR FOUND., ACCESS ACROSS
AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIvIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT, at v
(2011),
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/access
across-am

erica-first report-of the civiljustice infrastructure-mapping-project.pdf
[https://perma
.cc /DHS9-K8R5]).
246. While fragmentation poses a serious challenge, we must, however, address the
downsides of attempts to reduce this, namely coercive and systemic overregulation, especially of the poor, that can result in efforts to address legal problems in a more cohesive
manner. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Vulnerability, Access to Justice, and the Fragmented
State, 23 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51, 53-54 (2017).
247. A broader conversation about the intersection of technology, access to justice, and
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Relational status transition serves as an important launchpad
for considering how to build transitional equality through access
to justice. The confluence of lack of knowledge about marriage
and the deeply legally embedded nature of marriage and its impacts regarding money and parenthood render even more salient
the disproportionate representation of family law in the justice
gap crisis. Moreover, the impacts of the civil justice gap on women, older people, and LGBTQ communities highlight the unique
challenges of relational transition even in a context of marriage
equality. This is even more pronounced for married couples of color.
Policy innovation in the access to justice space must take into
account the heterogeneity of legal need comprising the justice
gap, including in the family law arena. Relational transition in
this marriage context provides the opportunity to think through
how we might meet people's everyday encounters with legal problems in an effort to bolster resilience in legal status transition.
D. Future Directions in Research
I have highlighted above a range of possibilities for future inquiry and impact to advance transitional equality in critical legal
theory, constitutional law, and policy and infrastructure. I discuss here some select future directions for research at the intersection of law and social science. Further research in the sociolegal domain can be useful for enabling researchers, policymakers,
and legal and social service providers to better understand how to
bolster resilience across relational status transition. This is especially important in times of uncertainty. While many same-sex
couples married during a time when movement on LGBTQ rights
appeared to be headed toward progress, fears about backlash and
rollback have pervaded the socio-political climate in recent years.
What opportunities does this present for researchers at the intersection of law and social sciences?

transitional equality falls outside of the scope of this article. RJ Vogt, Legal Tech Abounds,
but Not the Kind People Need Most, LAW360 (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.1aw360.com/artic
les/1123860/legal-tech-abounds-but-not-the-kind-people-need-most [https://perma.ccY66EPRND]; Rebecca L. Sandefur, Legal Tech for Non-Lawyers: Report of the Survey of US Legal Technologies, AM. BAR FOUND. 1, 9 (2019), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/up
loads/cms/documents/report-us-digital_1egal techfornonlawyers.pdf [https://perma.ccIY6
UZ-KJ3C].
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1. Uncertainty
This provides an important chance to further explore at least
two areas at the intersection of law and social science. First, we
can explore the impacts and mechanisms of uncertainty. As described above, those relationally transitioning bear the process
burden of legal uncertainty occasioned by continued discrimination, and generalized fear that marriage rights will be reversed
due to backlash and ongoing changes in political climate. 248 The
feeling of temporariness of legal rights pervades many couples'
decisions to marry and ongoing experiences of marriage. 249 Prevailing responses to ongoing resistance to marriage equality have
focused on bringing other aspects of formal legal status substantively in line with governing precedent, such as Obergefell.2 50 As I
have argued, focusing on relational status transition as a process
in itself, however, also brings into closer view the impacts of uncertainty. 251
A research agenda focused on uncertainty as a sociolegal phenomenon would dive into its impacts across the range of lived experience, including relational, individual, and community effects
in psychological, legal, political, and other social spheres. 2 52 For
instance, as discussed above, we might ask how uncertainty affects one's relationship, one's choices regarding family formation
or economic arrangement, psychological feelings of security, and
experiences of inclusion. Researchers should also explore the role
of race, gender, education, and economic status on experiences
and impacts of uncertainty. Especially in today's political context,
there is much research to be done on uncertainty as it also relates
to fears about backlash and rollback across other domains of so-

cial life.
One entry point into this conversation about uncertainty is
through the robust social scientific literature on minority stress,
including that of Ilan Meyer, which focuses on the negative psycho-social and health impacts of stigmatization of a broad range
of groups, including LGBTQ communities. 253 One recent interven248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See supra Part V.C.
See supraPart V.C.
See supra Part V.C.
See supra Part V.C.
See supra Part V.C.
See sources cited supra note 167.
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254
tion in this regard arose in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case.
Pursuant to this argument, permitting exemptions to antidiscrimination law that otherwise protect sexual minorities dangerously exacerbates minority stigma. 255 A stronger interdisciplinary conceptualization of uncertainty would look more closely at
the legal and psycho-social impacts of ongoing uncertainty itself,
even or especially in connection with established legal status
claims. This focus would enable us to build more responsive ap256 includproaches toward social resilience and relational health,
ing in the gaps between substantive and formal equality.

2. Legal Literacy and Access to Justice
As discussed above, lack of information imposes a process burden
on anyone relationally transitioning, but may raise particular issues for those whose families might depart from social assump257 As discussed above,
tions informing dominant legal structures.
marriage's seemingly pervasive and privileged character might
actually reduce the understanding of its dynamics, rather than
enhance it.258 The influential work of Lynn Baker and Robert
Emery, published now over twenty-five years ago, provides an
important foundation for further study of legal literacy about
marriage and divorce, which they found, is remarkably low in
general. 259
There is much to explore still in this domain. Here are just a
few questions. How does legal literacy in this domain compare
now across the population? How does it compare in different cohorts in society? 2 6 0 How does the social context surrounding large-

scale movements into marriage affect understanding of this sociolegal institution? 261 What are the gaps in this knowledge? How do
254. Brief of Amici Curiae, supranote 168, at 3-6, 20.
255. Id. at 3-6, 20-25.
256. See supra note 170 and accompanying test.
257. See supra Part V.A. ("Marriage's commonplace status may ironically overshadow
the depth of its connection to a variety of legal and regulatory systems.")
258. I leave for a separate discussion my argument that a similar sociolegal dynamic
exists in the context of gender discrimination.
259. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
260. As discussed above, we do not yet know the broader demographic patterns of
movements into marriage for same-sex couples post-Obergefell, but differences in race, education, economic status, and other socioeconomic status factors may inform legal consciousness in relational transition. See supra Part II.
261. As discussed, "[w]hile increasing some levels of legal awareness, the role of mar-
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people remedy these gaps, if at all? How do age, gender, race, education, and economic status affect understanding? How can further study inform legal and policy change and various forms of
legal and social service practice to bolster resilience for relational
transition? What impacts will be felt more widely on relational
status resilience from such further study?
Moreover, legal literacy is closely tied to access to justice. As
Sandefur has documented, many people may not even view their
justice needs as legal problems. Accordingly, funding more laywers may not solve the justice gap as it affects relational transition, as as discussed in this article, or in other contexts. This may
be even more pronounced in contexts where a positive right is
perceived to have been achieved, like marriage. Further areas of
research inquiry can follow Sandefur's work, which would identify legal consciousness among those who have achieved positive
rights. How does this affect one's view of whether one has legal
problems? How does membership within a historically marginalized community affect own's perceptions of these justice needs?
Questions like these comprise merely the tip of the research
iceberg.
CONCLUSION

Today's robust and important conversations about equality and
social change fail to address the deep connections between these
two spheres. Moreover, law and legal scholarship single-mindedly
focus on the comparative virtues of one regulatory regime or category over another, ignoring the process of transitioning from one
legal status category to another, its social, psychological, and legal dimensions, attendant challenges, and opportunities for fostering resilience. During times marked by inequality and rapid
social change, resilience through legal transition demands attention.
Relational status transition highlights the rich opportunity
that such movements pose for building even more sustained and
dynamic equality. Focusing on family and relationships enables
us to see even more clearly the social dimension of status change

riage in civil rights discourse may also obscure the transitional complexities it poses for
important aspects of everyday life." Supra Part V.A.
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and the interwoven nature between formal law and substantive
experience. Transitional equality helps us think through how we
might create and support more responsive social structures to
bolster resilience for families in legal passage. Critical legal theory, constitutional doctrine, policy and infrastructural thinking,
and mapping future inquiry in sociolegal research provide avenues for this work and inform future innovation. At bottom, the
goal is to support families holistically, in daily interaction, and
systemically. I have highlighted here some ways in which the
day-to-day experience of legal status transitions demands a multidimensional concept of legal process. I also argue for a multidisciplinary conception of resilience as a basis for achieving transitional equality. These insights can also help to enrich
conversation about a range of other status transitions in the context of today's much-needed discourse about social inequality concerning race, gender, class, immigration, incarceration, and other
areas. Attending to the process of status transition helps us
achieve a more robust equality and justice for individuals and
families, helping to make law's promise more real.

